Date: Sat, 15 Mar 2014 14:43:54 +0100
From: Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com>
To: M Kirschbaum <pr0ix@...oo.co.uk>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

Sockpuppet much?


On Sat, Mar 15, 2014 at 2:35 PM, M Kirschbaum <pr0ix@...oo.co.uk> wrote:

> Gynvael Coldwind,
>
> What Alfred has reiterated is that this is a security vulnerability
> irrelevantly of whether it qualifies for credit.
>
> It is an unusual one, but still a security vulnerability. Anyone who says
> otherwise is blind, has little or no experience in hands on security, or
> either has a different agenda.
>
> The obvious here is that Google dismissed it as a non-security issue which
> I find rather sad and somewhat ridiculous.
>
> Even if we asked Andrew Tanenbaum about ,I suspect his answers wouldn't be
> much different.
>
> Rgds,
>
>
>   On Saturday, 15 March 2014, 12:45, Gynvael Coldwind <gynvael@...dwind.pl>
> wrote:
>  Hey,
>
> I think the discussion digressed a little from the topic. Let's try to
> steer it back on it.
>
> What would make this a security vulnerability is one of the three standard
> outcomes:
>
> - information leak - i.e. leaking sensitive information that you normally
> do not have access to
> - remote code execution - in this case it would be:
> -- XSS - i.e. executing attacker provided JS/etc code in another user's
> browser, in the context *of a sensitive, non-sandboxed* domain (e.g.
> youtube.com)
> -- server-side code execution - i.e. executing attacker provided code on
> the youtube servers
> - denial of service - I think we all agree this bug doesn't increase the
> chance of a DoS; since you upload files that fail to be processed (so the
> CPU-consuming re-encoding is never run) I would argue that this decreases
> the chance of DoS if anything
>
> Which leaves us with the aforementioned RCE.
>
> I think we all agree that if Mr. Lemonias presents a PoC that uses the
> functionality he discovered to, either:
> (A) display a standard XSS alert(document.domain) in a sensitive domain
> (i.e. *.youtube.com or *.google.com, etc) for a different (test) user
> OR
> (B) execute code to fetch the standard /etc/passwd file from the youtube
> server and send it to him,
> then we will be convinced that this is vulnerability and will be satisfied
> by the presented proof.
>
> I think that further discussion without this proof is not leading anywhere.
>
>
> One more note - in the discussion I noticed some arguments were tried to
> be justified or backed by saying "I am this this and that, and have this
> many years of experience", e.g. (the first one I could find):
>
> "have worked for Lumension as a security consultant for more than a
> decade."
>
> Please note, that neither experience, nor job title, proves exploitability
> of a *potential* bug. Working exploits do.
>
>
> That's it from me. I'm looking forward to seeing the RCE exploits (be it
> client or server side).
>
> Kind regards,
> Gynvael Coldwind
>
>
>


-- 
“There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy
of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military
becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”

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