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Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 21:15:13 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Telegram authentication bypass

On Mon, 28 Apr 2014 11:17:31 +0200
jdiaz@...t.inteco.es wrote:

> This may allow
> an attacker leveraging this issue (e.g. by distributing a slightly
> modified client) to obtain almost full control of the victim's
> account.

I haven't read the details, but can you please explain how it is an
"attack" if I can control a user if I manage that he installs a
modified client?
I can do anything if a user installs a client I can modify. That's
no surprise and has nothing to do with the protocol in use.

I'm certainly not a fan of telegram's strange security protocol, but
this seriously sounds like strange FUD (haven't read the paper, maybe
it's just a joke or a fake).

-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

mail/jabber: hanno@...eck.de
GPG: BBB51E42

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