Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2014 01:34:36 -0400
From: Michael Brown <michael@...ermathie.net>
To: "Christian K." <waffenklang@...glemail.com>, fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Session Hijack Vulnerabilty on ebays german want ad?

Sounds like you want an option similar to what many websites (Google comes to mind) have: an option to revoke any other sessions except "this one" for your user.

Without such an option, there's nothing you can practically do in the general case if the website allows more than one session.

M.

  Original Message  
From: Christian K.
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2014 23:00
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Session Hijack Vulnerabilty on ebays german want ad?

Hi rob,

I tried what you said and it does not affect the other session.

The open session stays open and is not invalidated.

@all others: Thanks for all the helpful explanations; For me this is clear
now and I reported this issue.

Regards,

Christian


2014-06-24 22:03 GMT+02:00 R D <rd.seclists@...il.com>:

> Hi all,
> Yes Christian, this might be a security vulnerability, but it's an edge
> case.
>
> To me, the problem here is the difference between the user expectation and
> what really happens.
> A clear case of a similar vuln is when you log out of a website and what
> the website actually does is just deleting the cookies on your browser, but
> not invalidating the session Id server-side (so the session is still valid
> for any attacker holding onto the cookie).
> In your case, you click the "forgot password" button. One might say you
> have no expectation of this killing any other session you might have on the
> application. But in reality, the password reset function might be used in
> the case of a (suspected) account compromise; either you cannot login
> because an attacker has changed your password, or you can't be bothered to
> log in to change your password but you suspect someone might have gained
> access to your account. In both cases this is clearly not the intended
> behaviour as the attacker remains in control of your account.
>
> You might want to try changing your password while logged in and see if
> when the password is changed this way, the other sessions are invalidated.
>
> Regards,
> --rob'
>
> On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 9:39 PM, uname -a <sec.list@....net> wrote:
>
> > Yes it is a vector.
> > Imagin the following:
> > you go to a "friend". there you log in to your site.
> > before you leave, you forgotten to logout.
> > at home you change your password.
> > but your friend can still use your account.
> >
> > greetings
> >
> > Am 23.06.2014 20:21, schrieb Christian K.:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > i have a question if this is an attack vector (website is german want
> ad
> > > branch from ebay kleinanzeigen.ebay.de prob. english site affected
> too):
> > >
> > > On Computer A the browser (FF) has an open tab with the site where,
> when
> > > visited, user A is always signed on (because the specific site is the
> > user
> > > panel).
> > >
> > > On Computer B user A wants to log into his account, but forgot his
> > > password. He successfully changed his password using the "forgot
> > password"
> > > button and was able to log in.
> > >
> > > Then user A moves from Computer B to Computer A (which was off at the
> > time
> > > user A was at Computer B) and starts its browser where he realizes that
> > he
> > > is still logged into his account on the site without any password
> > > confirmation.
> > >
> > > As this happend to me, the question is: is this an attack vector (I
> > assume
> > > it is) and how can I as a user protect myself? Am not really into
> > security
> > > engineering (just non-sec-related software engineering...), so forgive
> my
> > > dumbness!
> > >
> > > Thanks.
> > >
> > >
> > > C.
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> > > http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> > > Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
> > >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> > http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> > Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
>

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists