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Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:09:42 +0100
From: Agazzini Maurizio <inode@...iaservice.net>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Red Hat JBoss EAP deserialization of untrusted data

Security Advisory           @ Mediaservice.net Srl
(#05, 23/11/2016)           Data Security Division

         Title:	Red Hat JBoss EAP deserialization of untrusted data
   Application:	JBoss EAP 5.2.X and prior versions
   Description:	The application server deserializes untrusted data via
                the JMX Invoker Servlet. This can lead to a DoS via
                resource exhaustion and potentially remote code
                execution.
        Author: Federico Dotta <federico.dotta@...iaservice.net>
                Maurizio Agazzini <inode@...iaservice.net>
 Vendor Status: Will not fix
 CVE Candidate: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project has
assigned
                the name CVE-2016-7065 to this issue.
    References: http://lab.mediaservice.net/advisory/2016-05-jboss.txt
                http://lab.mediaservice.net/code/jboss_payload.zip
                https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1382534

1. Abstract.

JBoss EAP's JMX Invoker Servlet is exposed by default on port 8080/TCP.
The communication employs serialized Java objects, encapsulated in HTTP
requests and responses.

The server deserializes these objects without checking the object type.
This behavior can be exploited to cause a denial of service and
potentially execute arbitrary code.

The objects that can cause the DoS are based on known disclosed payloads
taken from:

- https://gist.github.com/coekie/a27cc406fc9f3dc7a70d

Currently there is no known chain that allows code execution on JBoss
EAP, however new chains are discovered every day.

2. Example Attack Session.

Submit an authenticated POST request to the JMX Invoker Servlet URL (for
example: http://localhost:8080/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet) with one of
the following objects in the body of the request:

    * 01_BigString_limited.ser: it's a string object; the server will
      reply in a normal way (object size similar to the next one).
    * 02_SerialDOS_limited.ser: the application server will require
      about 2 minutes to execute the request with 100% CPU usage.
    * 03_BigString.ser: it's a string object; the server will
      reply in a normal way (object size similar to the next one).
    * 04_SerialDOS.ser: the application server will require an
      unknown amount of time to execute the request with 100% CPU usage.

3. Affected Platforms.

This vulnerability affects versions 4 and 5 of JBoss EAP.

4. Fix.

Red Hat will not fix the issue because JBoss EAP 4 is out of maintenance
support and JBoss EAP 5 is close to the end of its maintenance period.

5. Proof Of Concept.

See jboss_payload.zip and Example Attack Session above.

6. Timeline

06/10/2016 - First communication sent to Red Hat Security Response Team
07/10/2016 - Red Hat Security Response Team response, Bug 1382534
23/11/2016 - Security Advisory released

Copyright (c) 2016 @ Mediaservice.net Srl. All rights reserved.

-- 
Maurizio Agazzini                     CISSP, CSSLP, OPST
Senior Security Advisor
@ Mediaservice.net Srl                Tel: +39-011-32.72.100
Via Santorelli, 15                    Fax: +39-011-32.46.497
10095 Grugliasco (TO) ITALY           http://mediaservice.net/disclaimer

"C programmers never die. They are just cast into void"

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