lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2017 15:05:47 -0400
From: Whatis Yourbug <whatisyourbug@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Spider Player 2.5.3 [ Unsafe DLL Loading Vulnerability ]

1. OVERVIEW

The Spider Media Player is vulnerable to Insecure DLL Hijacking
Vulnerability. Similar terms that describe this vulnerability
have been come up with Remote Binary Planting, and Insecure DLL
Loading/Injection/Hijacking/Preloading.


2. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

Spider Player is a skinnable audio player with full support for all major
audio formats: MP3, AAC, WMA, OGG, FLAC and others. Its most interesting
features include audio streaming, integration with Shoutcast and Icecast
radio directories, lossless Internet radio recording, advanced CD Ripping
and Converting capabilities, FreeDB integration, 32-sound processing for
crystal-clear sound, customizable local and global hotkeys and crossfading
support. Spider Player is small and blazingly fast, and uses very few
system resources.

3. VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION

The Spider Media player application passes an insufficiently qualified path
in
loading an external library when a user launch the application

Affected Library List
---------------------
# dwmapi.dll
# olepro32.dll
# dsound.dll
# AUDIOSES.dll

4. VERSIONS AFFECTED

 2.5.3 and prior

5. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT/EXPLOIT

http://blog.pentest.space/2017/07/spider-player-253-unsafe-dll-loading.html

Tested Platform: Windows 7 x64 (Fresh Windows)

6. IMPACT

This occurs when an application fails to resolve a DLL because the DLL does
not exist in the specified path or search directories. If this happens, a
malicious Dll with the same name can be placed in the specified path
directory leading to remote code execution.


7. SOLUTION

For application developers:
    Require set paths for DLLs in applications

For system administrators:
    Disable write permissions to relative application folders
    Utilize least privilege access to prevent users (and applications) from
having too much access to the system

For both groups:
    Microsoft has a great article explaining the DLL-related registry keys
and how they can be used to protect applications -

http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx


8. VENDOR

VIT
https://spider-player.en.softonic.com/
http://spider-player.com/contact

9. CREDIT

This vulnerability was discovered by Ye Yint Min Thu htut,
http://pentest.space

10. DISCLOSURE TIME-LINE

07-26-2017: vulnerability discovered
07-26-2010: notified vendor [ vendor's website was no long avaiable  ]
07-26-2017: reported to cert.org for coordination
08-29-2017: vulnerability disclosed

11. REFERENCES
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2389418/secure-loading-of-libraries-to-prevent-dll-preloading-attacks
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html

_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ