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Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 10:22:13 +0800 From: Anand Jain <anand.jain@...cle.com> To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@....edu> Cc: linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption >>> +fscrypt is not guaranteed to protect confidentiality or authenticity >>> +if an attacker is able to manipulate the filesystem offline prior to >>> +an authorized user later accessing the filesystem. >> >> How does fscrypt / Android protect against Evil Maid attack. ? > _However_, an "Evil Maid" attacker can probably still do other, perhaps much > more effective attacks --- e.g. :: >. Or they could attack the actual > file contents encryption which is not authenticated. Or they could mess around > with filesystem metadata on the userdata partition, which is neither encrypted > nor authenticated. In specific, the scenario I had in mind was the above threat. > I suppose that dm-integrity could be used to protect against some of those > attacks, but of course it would not protect against hardware key loggers, etc. OK. I think AE is the only good solution for this, File-name encryption at this stage won't solve any kind of Evil Maid attack, (as it was quoted somewhere else in ML). Further, below, is define but not used. ----- #define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32 ----- Thanks, Anand
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