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Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 11:14:42 -0700 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> To: Anand Jain <anand.jain@...cle.com> Cc: "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 08:18:55PM +0800, Anand Jain wrote: > > > On 08/23/2017 01:36 AM, Eric Biggers wrote: > >On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 11:35:20PM +0800, Anand Jain wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I think AE is the only good solution for this, File-name encryption at > >>>>this stage won't solve any kind of Evil Maid attack, (as it was quoted > >>>>somewhere else in ML). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Further, below, is define but not used. > >>>>----- > >>>> #define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32 > >>>>----- > >>>> > >>> > >>>Yes, authenticated encryption with AES-256-GCM was in an older version of the > >>>ext4 encryption design document. But unfortunately it was never really thought > >>>through. The primary problem, even ignoring rollback protection, is that there > >>>is nowhere to store the per-block metadata (GCM authentication tag and IV) *and* > >>>have it updated atomicly with the block contents. Recently, dm-integrity solves > >>>this at the block device layer, but it uses data journaling which is very > >>>inefficient. This maybe could be implemented more efficiently on a COW > >>>filesystem like BTRFS. But even after that, another problem is that > >>>authenticated encryption of file contents only would not stop an attacker from > >>>swapping around blocks, files, directories, or creating links, etc. > >> > >> > >> Some of the problems to be solved in this area are quite > >>interesting and challenging and IMO BTRFS fits nicely. Per extent AE > >>for BTRFS is drafted, it needs scrutiny and constructive feedback. > >> > >>Thanks, Anand > >> > >> > >>>Eric > >>> > > > >Where is the code? Is there a design document, and it is it readable by people > >not as familiar with btrfs? Is the API compatible with ext4, f2fs, and ubifs? > > > >Eric > > (sorry for the delay in replay due to my vacation). > > Eric, No code yet, proposed encryption method is seeking review. > Link sent to you. > > Thanks, Anand Thanks, I'll review it when I have time. Can you please consider sending out a public link to linux-fscrypt, linux-fsdevel, linux-btrfs, etc. so that other people can review it too? Eric
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