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Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 14:09:58 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@...l.parknet.co.jp>,
Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@...reload.com>,
Mrunal Patel <mpatel@...hat.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alban Crequy <alban@...volk.io>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
Stéphane Graber <stgraber@...ntu.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, smbarber@...omium.org,
Phil Estes <estesp@...il.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount
aware
On Fri, Jan 22, 2021 at 05:26:32PM -0500, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> If I NFS-exported an idmapped mount, I think I'd expect idmapped clients
> to see the mapped IDs.
>
> Looks like that means taking the user namespace from the struct
> svc_export everwhere, for example:
>
> On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 02:19:24PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > index 66f2ef67792a..8d90796e236a 100644
> > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> > @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static int nfsd_acceptable(void *expv, struct dentry *dentry)
> > /* make sure parents give x permission to user */
> > int err;
> > parent = dget_parent(tdentry);
> > - err = inode_permission(d_inode(parent), MAY_EXEC);
> > + err = inode_permission(&init_user_ns,
> > + d_inode(parent), MAY_EXEC);
>
> err = inode_permission(exp->ex_path.mnt->mnt_userns,
> d_inode(parent, MAY_EXEC);
Hey Bruce, thanks! Imho, the clean approach for now is to not export
idmapped mounts until we have ported that part of nfs similar to what we
do for stacking filesystems for now. I've tested and taken this patch
into my tree:
---
>From 7a6a53bca1ecd8db872de1ee81d1a57e1829e525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Jan 2021 12:00:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
Prevent nfs from exporting idmapped mounts until we have ported it to
support exporting idmapped mounts.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@...hat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
/* v3 */
/* v4 */
/* v5 */
/* v5 */
patch introduced
base-commit: 19c329f6808995b142b3966301f217c831e7cf31
---
fs/nfsd/export.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.c b/fs/nfsd/export.c
index 81e7bb12aca6..e456421f68b4 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/export.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/export.c
@@ -369,8 +369,9 @@ static struct svc_export *svc_export_update(struct svc_export *new,
struct svc_export *old);
static struct svc_export *svc_export_lookup(struct svc_export *);
-static int check_export(struct inode *inode, int *flags, unsigned char *uuid)
+static int check_export(struct path *path, int *flags, unsigned char *uuid)
{
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
/*
* We currently export only dirs, regular files, and (for v4
@@ -394,6 +395,7 @@ static int check_export(struct inode *inode, int *flags, unsigned char *uuid)
* or an FSID number (so NFSEXP_FSID or ->uuid is needed).
* 2: We must be able to find an inode from a filehandle.
* This means that s_export_op must be set.
+ * 3: We must not currently be on an idmapped mount.
*/
if (!(inode->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV) &&
!(*flags & NFSEXP_FSID) &&
@@ -408,6 +410,11 @@ static int check_export(struct inode *inode, int *flags, unsigned char *uuid)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (mnt_user_ns(path->mnt) != &init_user_ns) {
+ dprintk("exp_export: export of idmapped mounts not yet supported.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (inode->i_sb->s_export_op->flags & EXPORT_OP_NOSUBTREECHK &&
!(*flags & NFSEXP_NOSUBTREECHECK)) {
dprintk("%s: %s does not support subtree checking!\n",
@@ -636,8 +643,7 @@ static int svc_export_parse(struct cache_detail *cd, char *mesg, int mlen)
goto out4;
}
- err = check_export(d_inode(exp.ex_path.dentry), &exp.ex_flags,
- exp.ex_uuid);
+ err = check_export(&exp.ex_path, &exp.ex_flags, exp.ex_uuid);
if (err)
goto out4;
/*
--
2.30.0
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