linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lkdtm: Add Shadow Call Stack tests

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Date:   Wed, 9 Mar 2022 12:16:47 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Dan Li <ashimida@...ux.alibaba.com>
Cc:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, arnd@...db.de, catalin.marinas@....com,
        gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux@...ck-us.net,
        luc.vanoostenryck@...il.com, elver@...gle.com,
        mark.rutland@....com, masahiroy@...nel.org, ojeda@...nel.org,
        nathan@...nel.org, npiggin@...il.com, ndesaulniers@...gle.com,
        samitolvanen@...gle.com, shuah@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
        will@...nel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        llvm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lkdtm: Add Shadow Call Stack tests

On Mon, Mar 07, 2022 at 07:16:36AM -0800, Dan Li wrote:
> The following code seems to work fine under clang/gcc, x86_64/aarch64
> (also tested in lkdtm_CFI_BACKWARD_SHADOW):
> 
> #include <stdio.h>
> 
> static __attribute__((noinline))
> void set_return_addr(unsigned long *expected, unsigned long *addr)
> {
>     /* Use of volatile is to make sure final write isn't seen as a dead store. */
>     unsigned long * volatile *ret_addr = (unsigned long **)__builtin_frame_address(0) + 1;
> 
>     /* Make sure we've found the right place on the stack before writing it. */
>     if(*ret_addr == expected)
>         *ret_addr = (addr);
> }
> 
> static volatile int force_label;
> 
> int main(void)
> {
>     void *array[] = {0, &&normal, &&redirected};
> 
>     if (force_label) {
>         /* Call it with a NULL to avoid parameters being treated as constants in -02. */
>         set_return_addr(NULL, NULL);
>         goto * array[force_label];
>     }

Hah! I like that. :) I had a weird switch statement that was working for
me; this is cleaner.

> 
>     do {
> 
>         set_return_addr(&&normal, &&redirected);
> 
> normal:
>         printf("I should be skipped\n");
>         break;
> 
> redirected:
>         printf("Redirected\n");
> 
>     } while (0);
> 
>     return 0;
> }
> 
> But currently it still crashes when I try to enable
> "-mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf+bti".
> 
> Because the address of "&&redirected" is not encrypted under pac,
> the autiasp check will fail when set_return_addr returns, and
> eventually cause the function to crash when it returns to "&&redirected"
> ("&&redirected" as a reserved label always seems to start with a bti j
> insn).

Strictly speaking, this is entirely correct. :)

> For lkdtm, if we're going to handle both cases in one function, maybe
> it would be better to turn off the -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf+bti
> and maybe also turn off -O2 options for the function :)

If we can apply a function attribute to turn off pac for the "does this
work without protections", that should be sufficient.

-- 
Kees Cook