linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities

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Date:	Sun, 10 Sep 2006 22:03:37 +0200
From:	David Madore <david.madore@....fr>
To:	Joshua Brindle <method@...too.org>
Cc:	Linux Kernel mailing-list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM mailing-list <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities

On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 01:56:43PM -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote:
> To expand on this a little, some of the capabilities you are looking to 
> add are of very little if any use without being able to specify objects. 
> For example, CAP_REG_OPEN is whether the process can open any file 
> instead of specific ones. How many applications open no files whatsoever 
> in practice? Even if there are some as soon as they change and need to 
> open a file they'll need this capability and will be able to open any. 
> CAP_REG_WRITE has the same problem. For a description of why 
> CAP_REG_EXEC is meaningless see the digsig thread on the LSM list from 
> earlier this year.

CAP_REG_OPEN and CAP_REG_EXEC might be useful only for demonstration
purposes, but I've *often* wished I could run a program without
CAP_REG_WRITE because I wasn't root and I wanted to make *sure* it
didn't write any file anywhere.  Instead I had to run them from a
user-mode-linux, which is horribly messy and doesn't work well (and,
at best, with a noticeable slowdown).

Again, I ask: is SElinux useable if you aren't root?  (Assuming it's
activated, of course: I mean, can you create new policies to make
certain programs run with restricted privileges?)  I thought it
wasn't, but maybe I'm wrong.

-- 
     David A. Madore
    (david.madore@....fr,
     http://www.madore.org/~david/ )
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