lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:	Tue, 20 Feb 2007 20:28:31 +0900
From:	KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
To:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
CC:	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH -mm] file caps: make on-disk capabilities future-proof

Hi, Serge.

Thanks for the information.
I'll update the userspace utilities next weekend.

Please wait for a while.

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Stephen Smalley has pointed out that the current file capabilities
> will eventually pose a problem.
> 
> As the capability set changes and distributions start tagging
> binaries with capabilities, we would like for running an older
> kernel to not necessarily make those binaries unusable.  The
> following patch tries to address that.  Kaigai, if we went with
> this patch, your userspace tools would need to be updated to
> (a) insert a size parameter, and (b) update the
> _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION.
> 
> It would be nice to solve this before file caps hit mainline.
> 
> thanks,
> -serge
> 
> From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> Subject: [PATCH -mm] file caps: make on-disk capabilities future-proof
> 
> Stephen Smalley has pointed out that the current file capabilities
> will eventually pose a problem.
> 
> As the capability set changes and distributions start tagging
> binaries with capabilities, we would like for running an older
> kernel to not necessarily make those binaries unusable.  To
> that end,
> 
> 	1. If capabilities are specified which we don't know
> 	   about, just ignore them, do not return -EPERM as we
> 	   were doing before.
> 	2. Specify a size with the on-disk capability implementation.
> 	   In this implementation the size is the number of __u32's
> 	   used for each of (eff,perm,inh).  For now, sz is 1.
> 	   When we move to 64-bit capabilities, it becomes 2.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
> 
> ---
> 
>  include/linux/capability.h |   18 ++++++--
>  security/commoncap.c       |  100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>  2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
> 
> f4beca776d303bbb6348dc08e4d02c3bd37f3a83
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 2776886..1de7a85 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
>     library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
>     etc.. */
>   
> -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  0x19980330
> +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  0x20070215
>  
>  typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
>  	__u32 version;
> @@ -44,11 +44,21 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
>  
>  #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
>  #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
> +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ (5*sizeof(__le32))
> +/*
> + * sz is the # of __le32's in each set, 1 for now.
> + * data[] is organized as:
> + *   effective[0..sz-1]
> + *   permitted[0..sz-1]
> + *   inheritable[0..sz-1]
> + *   ...
> + * this way we can just read as much of the on-disk capability as
> + * we know should exist and know we'll get the data we'll need.
> + */
>  struct vfs_cap_data_disk {
>  	__le32 version;
> -	__le32 effective;
> -	__le32 permitted;
> -	__le32 inheritable;
> +	__le32 sz;
> +	__le32 data[];  /* effective[sz], permitted[sz], inheritable[sz] */
>  };
>  
>  #ifdef __KERNEL__
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index be86acb..dc8bf4f 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -111,35 +111,32 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct 
>  }
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
> -static inline void cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data_disk *dcap,
> -					struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
> +static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data_disk *dcap,
> +					struct vfs_cap_data *cap, int size)
>  {
> +	__u32 sz;
> +
>  	cap->version = le32_to_cpu(dcap->version);
> -	cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(dcap->effective);
> -	cap->permitted = le32_to_cpu(dcap->permitted);
> -	cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(dcap->inheritable);
> +	sz = le32_to_cpu(dcap->sz);
> +
> +	if ((sz*3+2)*sizeof(__u32) != size) {
> +		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: sz is %d, size is %d, should be %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
> +			sz, size, (sz*3+2)*sizeof(__u32));
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(dcap->data[0]);
> +	cap->permitted = le32_to_cpu(dcap->data[sz]);
> +	cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(dcap->data[sz*2]);
> +
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
>  {
> -	int i;
> -
>  	if (cap->version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION)
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> -	for (i = CAP_NUMCAPS; i < 8*sizeof(cap->effective); i++) {
> -		if (cap->effective & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> -			return -EPERM;
> -	}
> -	for (i = CAP_NUMCAPS; i < 8*sizeof(cap->permitted); i++) {
> -		if (cap->permitted & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> -			return -EPERM;
> -	}
> -	for (i = CAP_NUMCAPS; i < 8*sizeof(cap->inheritable); i++) {
> -		if (cap->inheritable & CAP_TO_MASK(i))
> -			return -EPERM;
> -	}
> -
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -148,50 +145,65 @@ static int set_file_caps(struct linux_bi
>  {
>  	struct dentry *dentry;
>  	ssize_t rc;
> -	struct vfs_cap_data_disk dcaps;
> +	struct vfs_cap_data_disk *dcaps;
>  	struct vfs_cap_data caps;
>  	struct inode *inode;
> -	int err;
>  
>  	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
>  	inode = dentry->d_inode;
> -	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
> -		dput(dentry);
> -		return 0;
> +	rc = 0;
> +	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
> +	if (rc == -ENODATA) {
> +		rc = 0;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto out;
> +	if (rc < sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data_disk)) {
> +		rc = -EINVAL;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	dcaps = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!dcaps) {
> +		rc = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, dcaps,
> +						XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
> +	if (rc == -ENODATA) {
> +		rc = 0;
> +		goto out_free;
>  	}
>  
> -	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &dcaps,
> -						sizeof(dcaps));
> -	dput(dentry);
> -
> -	if (rc == -ENODATA)
> -		return 0;
> -
>  	if (rc < 0) {
>  		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: Error (%zd) getting xattr\n",
>  				__FUNCTION__, rc);
> -		return rc;
> +		goto out_free;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (rc != sizeof(dcaps)) {
> -		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: got wrong size for getxattr (%zd)\n",
> -					__FUNCTION__, rc);
> -		return -EPERM;
> -	}
> -
> -	cap_from_disk(&dcaps, &caps);
> -	err = check_cap_sanity(&caps);
> -	if (err)
> -		return err;
> +	rc = cap_from_disk(dcaps, &caps, rc);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out_free;
> +	rc = check_cap_sanity(&caps);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out_free;
>  
>  	bprm->cap_effective = caps.effective;
>  	bprm->cap_permitted = caps.permitted;
>  	bprm->cap_inheritable = caps.inheritable;
>  
> -	return 0;
> +out_free:
> +	kfree(dcaps);
> +out:
> +	dput(dentry);
> +	return rc;
>  }
>  #else
>  static inline int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)


-- 
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ