linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Date:	Sun, 27 May 2007 16:34:10 +0800
From:	Cliffe <cliffe@...et.net.au>
To:	Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>
CC:	casey@...aufler-ca.com, Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM
 hook

 >> On the other hand, if you actually want to protect the _data_, then 
tagging the _name_ is flawed; tag the *DATA* instead.

Would it make sense to label the data (resource) with a list of paths 
(names) that can be used to access it?

Therefore the data would be protected against being accessed via 
alternative arbitrary names. This may be a simple label to maintain and 
(possibly to) enforce, allowing path based confinement to protect a 
resource. This may allow for the benefits of pathname based confinement 
while avoiding some of its problems.

Obviously this would not protect against a pathname pointing to 
arbitrary data…

Just a thought.

Z. Cliffe Schreuders.

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