linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Date:	Fri, 22 Jun 2007 21:34:30 +1000
From:	Neil Brown <neilb@...e.de>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:	Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...e.de>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
	pathname matching

On Friday June 22, sds@...ho.nsa.gov wrote:
> > 
> > Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
> 
> My use case is being able to protect data reliably.  Yours?

Saying "protect data" is nearly meaningless without a threat model.
I bet you don't try to protect data from a direct nuclear hit, or a
court order.

AA has a fairly clear threat model.  It involves a flaw in a
program being used by an external agent to cause it to use
privileges it would not normally exercise to subvert privacy or
integrity.
I think this model matches a lot of real threats that real sysadmins
have real concerns about.  I believe that the design of AA addresses
this model quite well. 

What is your threat model?  Maybe it is just different.

NeilBrown
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