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Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2007 18:17:30 -0800 (PST)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
apparmor-dev <apparmor-dev@...ge.novell.com>
Subject: Re: AppArmor Security Goal
--- Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com> wrote:
> Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> ...
>
> Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit
> policy? I would like to better understand the problem here.
>
> Note that John Johansen is also interested in allowing non-privileged
> users to manipulate AppArmor policy, but his view was to only allow a
> non-privileged user to further tighten the profile on a program. To me,
> that adds complexity with not much value, but if lots of users want it,
> then I'm wrong :)
Now this is getting interesting. It looks to me as if you've implemented
a mandatory access control scheme that some people would like to be able
to use as a discretionary access control scheme. This is creepy after
seeing the MCS implementation in SELinux, which is also a DAC scheme
wacked out of a MAC scheme. Very interesting indeed.
Casey Schaufler
casey@...aufler-ca.com
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