linux-kernel - Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface)

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Date:	Mon, 26 Nov 2007 14:42:20 -0600
From:	serge@...lyn.com
To:	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...spincowan.com>,
	Ray Lee <ray-lk@...rabbit.org>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...nel.org>,
	Simon Arlott <simon@...e.lp0.eu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...putergmbh.de>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>,
	Thomas Fricaccia <thomas_fricacci@...oo.com>,
	Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Giacomo Catenazzi <cate@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to
	static interface)

(finally starting to make headway through this thread over a month late)

Quoting Alan Cox (alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk):
> > To reject an LSM for providing "bad" security, IMHO you should have to
> > show how it is possible to subvert the self-stated goals of that LSM.
> > Complaints that the LSM fails to meet some goal outside of its stated
> > purpose is irrelevant. Conjecture that it probably can be violated
> > because of $contrivance is just so much FUD.
> 
> That seems to be an appropriate test.
> 
> > Exception: it is valid to say that the self-stated goal is too narrow to
> > be useful. But IMHO that bar of "too narrow" should be very, very low.
> > Defenses against specific modes of attack would be a fine thing to build
> > up in the library of LSMs, especially if we got a decent stacking module
> > so that they could be composed.
> 
> Once you have stacking then it actually at times will make sense to have
> security modules that do one very precise thing and do it well.

Hey - I thought it was the other way around?  :)

-serge
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