| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Sun, 02 Dec 2007 12:29:53 +0900
From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
To: Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
CC: serge@...lyn.com, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ch.ncsc.mil>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding
set (v10)
> There is already a pam_cap module in the libcap2 package. Can we merge
> this functionality?
I think it is a good idea.
However, this module already have a feature to modify inheritable
capability set.
How does it to be described in the "/etc/security/capability.conf"?
One idea is like a following convention:
# compatible configuration. We can omit "i:" at the head of line
cap_setfcap tak
# It drops any capabilities from b-set except for cap_net_raw and cap_fowner
b:cap_net_raw,cap_fowner ymj
# It drops only cap_dac_override from b-set.
b:-cap_dac_override kaigai
# It drops only cap_sys_admin from b-set of any user within users group.
b:-cap_sys_admin group:users
Thanks,
> Cheers
>
> Andrew
>
> serge@...lyn.com wrote:
>> Quoting KaiGai Kohei (kaigai@...gai.gr.jp):
>>> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>> The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities
>>>> cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be
>>>> manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities.
>>>> Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps
>>>> except CAP_SETPCAP.
>>> Serge,
>>>
>>> This feature makes me being interested in.
>>> I think you intend to apply this feature for the primary process
>>> of security container.
>>> However, it is also worthwhile to apply when a session is starting up.
>>>
>>> The following PAM module enables to drop capability bounding bit
>>> specified by the fifth field in /etc/passwd entry.
>>> This code is just an example now, but considerable feature.
>>>
>>> build and install:
>>> # gcc -Wall -c pam_cap_drop.c
>>> # gcc -Wall -shared -Xlinker -x -o pam_cap_drop.so pam_cap_drop.o -lpam
>>> # cp pam_cap_drop.so /lib/security
>>>
>>> modify /etc/passwd as follows:
>>>
>>> tak:x:1004:100:cap_drop=cap_net_raw,cap_chown:/home/tak:/bin/bash
>>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>> example:
>>> [kaigai@...u ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
>>> PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
>>> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.23 ms
>>> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=1.02 ms
>>>
>>> --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
>>> 2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 999ms
>>> rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.023/1.130/1.237/0.107 ms
>>>
>>> [kaigai@...u ~]$ ssh tak@...alhost
>>> tak@...alhost's password:
>>> Last login: Sat Dec 1 10:09:29 2007 from masu.myhome.cx
>>> [tak@...u ~]$ export LANG=C
>>> [tak@...u ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
>>> ping: icmp open socket: Operation not permitted
>>>
>>> [tak@...u ~]$ su
>>> Password:
>>> pam_cap_bset[6921]: user root does not have 'cap_drop=' property
>>> [root@...u tak]# cat /proc/self/status | grep ^Cap
>>> CapInh: 0000000000000000
>>> CapPrm: 00000000ffffdffe
>>> CapEff: 00000000ffffdffe
>>> [root@...u tak]#
>> Neat. A bigger-stick version of not adding the account to
>> group wheel. I'll use that.
>>
>> Is there any reason not to have a separate /etc/login.capbounds
>> config file, though, so the account can still have a full name?
>> Did you only use that for convenience of proof of concept, or
>> is there another reason?
>>
>>> # BTW, I replaced the James's address in the Cc: list,
>>> # because MTA does not accept it.
>> Thanks! I don't know what happened to my alias for him...
>>
>> thanks,
>> -serge
>>
>>> --
>>> KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
>>>
>>> ************************************************************
>>> pam_cap_drop.c
>>> ************************************************************
>>>
>>> /*
>>> * pam_cap_drop.c module -- drop capabilities bounding set
>>> *
>>> * Copyright: 2007 KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
>>> */
>>>
>>> #include <errno.h>
>>> #include <pwd.h>
>>> #include <stdlib.h>
>>> #include <stdio.h>
>>> #include <string.h>
>>> #include <syslog.h>
>>> #include <sys/prctl.h>
>>> #include <sys/types.h>
>>>
>>> #include <security/pam_modules.h>
>>>
>>> #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
>>> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
>>> #endif
>>>
>>> static char *captable[] = {
>>> "cap_chown",
>>> "cap_dac_override",
>>> "cap_dac_read_search",
>>> "cap_fowner",
>>> "cap_fsetid",
>>> "cap_kill",
>>> "cap_setgid",
>>> "cap_setuid",
>>> "cap_setpcap",
>>> "cap_linux_immutable",
>>> "cap_net_bind_service",
>>> "cap_net_broadcast",
>>> "cap_net_admin",
>>> "cap_net_raw",
>>> "cap_ipc_lock",
>>> "cap_ipc_owner",
>>> "cap_sys_module",
>>> "cap_sys_rawio",
>>> "cap_sys_chroot",
>>> "cap_sys_ptrace",
>>> "cap_sys_pacct",
>>> "cap_sys_admin",
>>> "cap_sys_boot",
>>> "cap_sys_nice",
>>> "cap_sys_resource",
>>> "cap_sys_time",
>>> "cap_sys_tty_config",
>>> "cap_mknod",
>>> "cap_lease",
>>> "cap_audit_write",
>>> "cap_audit_control",
>>> "cap_setfcap",
>>> NULL,
>>> };
>>>
>>>
>>> PAM_EXTERN int
>>> pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>>> int argc, const char **argv)
>>> {
>>> struct passwd *pwd;
>>> char *pos, *buf;
>>> char *username = NULL;
>>>
>>> /* open system logger */
>>> openlog("pam_cap_bset", LOG_PERROR | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
>>>
>>> /* get the unix username */
>>> if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &username) != PAM_SUCCESS || !username)
>>> return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
>>>
>>> /* get the passwd entry */
>>> pwd = getpwnam(username);
>>> if (!pwd)
>>> return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
>>>
>>> /* Is there "cap_drop=" ? */
>>> pos = strstr(pwd->pw_gecos, "cap_drop=");
>>> if (pos) {
>>> buf = strdup(pos + sizeof("cap_drop=") - 1);
>>> if (!buf)
>>> return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
>>> pos = strtok(buf, ",");
>>> while (pos) {
>>> int rc, i;
>>>
>>> for (i=0; captable[i]; i++) {
>>> if (!strcmp(pos, captable[i])) {
>>> rc = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i);
>>> if (rc < 0) {
>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s could not drop %s (%s)",
>>> username, captable[i], strerror(errno));
>>> break;
>>> }
>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s drops %s\n", username, captable[i]);
>>> goto next;
>>> }
>>> }
>>> break;
>>> next:
>>> pos = strtok(NULL, ",");
>>> }
>>> free(buf);
>>> } else {
>>> syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s does not have 'cap_drop=' property", username);
>>> }
>>> return PAM_SUCCESS;
>>> }
>>>
>>> PAM_EXTERN int
>>> pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>>> int argc, const char **argv)
>>> {
>>> /* do nothing */
>>> return PAM_SUCCESS;
>>> }
>>>
>>> ************************************************************
>>> -
>>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
>>> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
>>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
>
> iD8DBQFHUbHDmwytjiwfWMwRAj5uAJ9+OB8ljQlJAhKW7jxJWrIPa1k2vgCdHFL9
> 3zXtwGz+cVeThb53/kAmdCs=
> =OdM7
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> -
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...gai.gr.jp>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists