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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Sat, 02 Feb 2008 22:11:18 -0800
From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>
To: serge@...lyn.com
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux Security Modules List
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] per-process securebits
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serge@...lyn.com wrote:
| Quoting Andrew G. Morgan (morgan@...nel.org):
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|>
|> Here is the patch to add per-process securebits.
|>
|> Its all code that lives inside the capability LSM and the new securebits
|> implementation is only active if CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
|> enabled (it doesn't make much sense to support this feature without
|> filesystem capabilities).
|>
|> The patch assumes the CAP_SETPCAP fix of last week, but is otherwise on
|> top of 2.6.24-rc8-mm1.
|
| Hey Andrew, I'm about to set up some ltp tests, but noticed the
| following patch is needed on top of yours.
Sorry about that. I'm guessing you have a more pedantic compiler than
mine (x86_64)!
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>
Cheers
Andrew
|
| -serge
|
|>From feac61b47be8375e25b0f6ee876cf096c8b1b9cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
| From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
| Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2008 14:13:29 +0000
| Subject: [PATCH 1/1] per-process securebits: security_task_prctl takes
a long
|
| Fix a mismatch between prototypes and callers for the updated
| security_task_prctl(). The newly introduced argument, error,
| is a long, not an int.
|
| Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com>
| ---
| include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++----
| security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
| security/dummy.c | 2 +-
| security/security.c | 2 +-
| security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
| 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
|
| diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
| index c550079..c789a0d 100644
| --- a/include/linux/security.h
| +++ b/include/linux/security.h
| @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid,
uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
| extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
| extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid);
| extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
| - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p);
| + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
| extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp);
| extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
| extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
| @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ struct security_operations {
| int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct * p);
| int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
| unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
| - unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p);
| + unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
| void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);
| void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
|
| @@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
struct siginfo *info,
| int sig, u32 secid);
| int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
| int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long
arg3,
| - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p);
| + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
| void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
| void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
| int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
| @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ static inline int security_task_wait (struct
task_struct *p)
| static inline int security_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2,
| unsigned long arg3,
| unsigned long arg4,
| - unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p)
| + unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
| {
| return 0;
| }
| diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
| index 9b87182..858387a 100644
| --- a/security/commoncap.c
| +++ b/security/commoncap.c
| @@ -611,9 +611,9 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct
siginfo *info,
| #endif
|
| int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
| - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p)
| + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
| {
| - int error = 0;
| + long error = 0;
|
| switch (option) {
| case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
| diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
| index c9e6d9f..e79f988 100644
| --- a/security/dummy.c
| +++ b/security/dummy.c
| @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static int dummy_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
struct siginfo *info,
| }
|
| static int dummy_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
| - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p)
| + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
| {
| return 0;
| }
| diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
| index c3cc14e..6f53155 100644
| --- a/security/security.c
| +++ b/security/security.c
| @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
| }
|
| int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long
arg3,
| - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, int *rc_p)
| + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
| {
| return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
| }
| diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
| index 3c88858..a553984 100644
| --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
| +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
| @@ -3210,7 +3210,7 @@ static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
| unsigned long arg3,
| unsigned long arg4,
| unsigned long arg5,
| - int *rc_p)
| + long *rc_p)
| {
| /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
| any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
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