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Date:	Mon, 18 Feb 2008 15:58:38 -0800
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, serue@...ibm.com,
	morgan@...nel.org
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] [RFC] Smack update for file capabilities

From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>

This patch assumes "Smack unlabeled outgoing ambient packets - v4"
which is one reason it's RFC.

Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability
"module" as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for
file based capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>

---

 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |   63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap//Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
--- linux-2.6.25-g0216-precap/security/smack/smack_lsm.c	2008-02-18 10:53:45.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.25-g0216/security/smack/smack_lsm.c	2008-02-18 14:15:25.000000000 -0800
@@ -584,6 +584,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vf
 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
 				void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
 		    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
@@ -658,6 +664,12 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct d
  */
 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -1016,7 +1028,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct t
  */
 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1028,7 +1045,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct tas
  */
 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1053,7 +1075,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct t
 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
 				   struct sched_param *lp)
 {
-	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1093,6 +1120,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct 
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
 	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
@@ -1778,6 +1810,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct k
 	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
 }
 
+/* module stacking operations */
+
+/**
+ * smack_register_security - stack capability module
+ * @name: module name
+ * @ops: module operations - ignored
+ *
+ * Allow the capability module to register.
+ */
+static int smack_register_security(const char *name,
+				   struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
+	       __func__, name);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
  * @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -2412,6 +2465,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
 	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
 	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
 	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
+	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
+	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
 	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
 	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2471,6 +2526,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_
 	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
 	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
 
+	.register_security = 		smack_register_security,
+
 	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
 
 	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,

--
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