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Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 19:12:47 +0100 (BST)
From: Hugh Dickins <hugh@...itas.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
cc: Erez Zadok <ezk@...sunysb.edu>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH -mm] unionfs: build fixes
Get unionfs building and working in mmotm with the 2.6.27-rc1 VFS changes:
permission() has been replaced by inode_permission() without nameidata arg;
unionfs_permission() without nameidata arg; vfs_symlink() without mode arg;
LOOKUP_ACCESS no longer defined; and kmem_cache_create() no longer passes
kmem_cachep to the init_once() constructor.
Note: while okay for inclusion in -mm for now, unionfs_permission() mods
will need review and perhaps correction by Erez: without a nameidata arg,
some locking vanishes from unionfs_permission(), and a MNT_NOEXEC check on
its lower_inode; I have not studied the VFS changes enough to tell whether
that amounts to a real issue for unionfs, or just removal of dead code.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@...itas.com>
Cc: Erez Zadok <ezk@...sunysb.edu>
---
This should follow git-unionfs.patch
I notice my unionfs-fix-memory-leak.patch
and fsstack-fsstack_copy_inode_size-locking.patch
are currently commented out, yet I don't recall the
mm-commits dispatch rider bringing me a telegram to explain why?
fs/unionfs/dirhelper.c | 2 +-
fs/unionfs/inode.c | 16 +++-------------
fs/unionfs/lookup.c | 5 +----
fs/unionfs/sioq.c | 2 +-
fs/unionfs/super.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- mmotm.orig/fs/unionfs/dirhelper.c 2008-07-29 17:47:09.000000000 +0100
+++ mmotm/fs/unionfs/dirhelper.c 2008-07-29 18:26:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int delete_whiteouts(struct dentry *dent
lower_dir = lower_dir_dentry->d_inode;
BUG_ON(!S_ISDIR(lower_dir->i_mode));
- if (!permission(lower_dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL)) {
+ if (!inode_permission(lower_dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) {
err = do_delete_whiteouts(dentry, bindex, namelist);
} else {
args.deletewh.namelist = namelist;
--- mmotm.orig/fs/unionfs/inode.c 2008-07-29 18:21:46.000000000 +0100
+++ mmotm/fs/unionfs/inode.c 2008-07-29 18:26:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -462,7 +462,6 @@ static int unionfs_symlink(struct inode
struct dentry *lower_parent_dentry = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
int valid = 0;
- umode_t mode;
unionfs_read_lock(dentry->d_sb, UNIONFS_SMUTEX_CHILD);
unionfs_lock_dentry(dentry, UNIONFS_DMUTEX_CHILD);
@@ -497,9 +496,7 @@ static int unionfs_symlink(struct inode
goto out;
}
- mode = S_IALLUGO;
- err = vfs_symlink(lower_parent_dentry->d_inode, lower_dentry,
- symname, mode);
+ err = vfs_symlink(lower_parent_dentry->d_inode, lower_dentry, symname);
if (!err) {
err = PTR_ERR(unionfs_interpose(dentry, parent->i_sb, 0));
if (!err) {
@@ -872,8 +869,7 @@ static void unionfs_put_link(struct dent
* unionfs_permission, or anything it calls, will use stale branch
* information.
*/
-static int unionfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
- struct nameidata *nd)
+static int unionfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
struct inode *lower_inode = NULL;
int err = 0;
@@ -881,9 +877,6 @@ static int unionfs_permission(struct ino
const int is_file = !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
const int write_mask = (mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(mask & MAY_READ);
- if (nd)
- unionfs_lock_dentry(nd->path.dentry, UNIONFS_DMUTEX_CHILD);
-
if (!UNIONFS_I(inode)->lower_inodes) {
if (is_file) /* dirs can be unlinked but chdir'ed to */
err = -ESTALE; /* force revalidate */
@@ -923,7 +916,7 @@ static int unionfs_permission(struct ino
* readonly, because those conditions should lead to a
* copyup taking place later on.
*/
- err = permission(lower_inode, mask, nd);
+ err = inode_permission(lower_inode, mask);
if (err && bindex > 0) {
umode_t mode = lower_inode->i_mode;
if (is_robranch_super(inode->i_sb, bindex) &&
@@ -955,9 +948,6 @@ static int unionfs_permission(struct ino
out:
unionfs_check_inode(inode);
- unionfs_check_nd(nd);
- if (nd)
- unionfs_unlock_dentry(nd->path.dentry);
return err;
}
--- mmotm.orig/fs/unionfs/lookup.c 2008-07-29 18:21:46.000000000 +0100
+++ mmotm/fs/unionfs/lookup.c 2008-07-29 18:26:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int is_opaque_
mutex_lock(&lower_inode->i_mutex);
- if (!permission(lower_inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL)) {
+ if (!inode_permission(lower_inode, MAY_EXEC)) {
wh_lower_dentry =
lookup_one_len(UNIONFS_DIR_OPAQUE, lower_dentry,
sizeof(UNIONFS_DIR_OPAQUE) - 1);
@@ -635,9 +635,6 @@ int init_lower_nd(struct nameidata *nd,
nd->intent.open.file = file;
#endif /* ALLOC_LOWER_ND_FILE */
break;
- case LOOKUP_ACCESS:
- nd->flags = flags;
- break;
default:
/*
* We should never get here, for now.
--- mmotm.orig/fs/unionfs/sioq.c 2008-07-29 18:21:46.000000000 +0100
+++ mmotm/fs/unionfs/sioq.c 2008-07-29 18:26:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void __unionfs_symlink(struct work_struc
struct sioq_args *args = container_of(work, struct sioq_args, work);
struct symlink_args *s = &args->symlink;
- args->err = vfs_symlink(s->parent, s->dentry, s->symbuf, s->mode);
+ args->err = vfs_symlink(s->parent, s->dentry, s->symbuf);
complete(&args->comp);
}
--- mmotm.orig/fs/unionfs/super.c 2008-07-29 18:21:46.000000000 +0100
+++ mmotm/fs/unionfs/super.c 2008-07-29 18:26:12.000000000 +0100
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ static void unionfs_destroy_inode(struct
}
/* unionfs inode cache constructor */
-static void init_once(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *obj)
+static void init_once(void *obj)
{
struct unionfs_inode_info *i = obj;
--
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