linux-kernel - Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interfaceforon access scanning

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Date:	Tue, 5 Aug 2008 11:11:41 -0700
From:	Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
To:	"Press, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Press@...com>
Cc:	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	malware-list@...ts.printk.net,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux
	interfaceforon access scanning


A: No.
Q: Should I include quotations after my reply?

On Tue, Aug 05, 2008 at 02:04:26PM -0400, Press, Jonathan wrote:
> I'm not sure if this is off the direct idea of this thread, or if I am
> possibly missing the whole point.

I think you might be missing the point a bit here, as the traditional
Unix model that Linux has prevents much of what the "traditional AV"
products need to do, right?

> However, I want to point out that scanning on close is still an integral
> part of AV protection, even if intercepting opens and execs
> theoretically catches everything.

Great, then put a hook in glibc and catch all closes and then kick off
your scanning.

> You can say that there are four parts to the malware life cycle --
> getting on a machine, residing there, causing local damage, and
> propagating elsewhere.  It is part of the philosophy of AV protection
> that you do everything you can to prevent all of them.

But this proposed patchset does not do much to prevent all of these,
right?

> That's why there are scans on close, scheduled scans, and scans on
> open.  Most of our users employ all three and do not rely on one or
> two.  If an infection arrives on a machine and finds a home because it
> is assumed that it will be caught when it is opened for use, then it
> is just one more compromise away from doing damage and/or spreading.

So how are you going about preventing the "infection from arriving"
with this proposed patchset?

Isn't that something that SELinux or another LSM can prevent better?

thanks,

greg k-h
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