linux-kernel - Re: [malware-list] TALPA - a threat model? well sorta.

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Date:	Thu, 14 Aug 2008 18:37:31 -0700 (PDT)
From:	david@...g.hm
To:	tvrtko.ursulin@...hos.com
cc:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	andi@...stfloor.org, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	hch@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	malware-list@...ts.printk.net,
	malware-list-bounces@...sg.printk.net, peterz@...radead.org,
	viro@...IV.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [malware-list] TALPA - a threat model?  well sorta.

On Thu, 14 Aug 2008, tvrtko.ursulin@...hos.com wrote:

> Eric Paris wrote on 13/08/2008 19:57:44:
>
>>> It's clear from the protection model that you described that on 'read'
>>> you want to wait until the scan is done before you give the data to
> the
>>> process asking for it... and that's totally reasonable: "Do not give
>>> out bad data" is a very clear line in terms of security.
>>>
>>> for the "dirty" case it gets muddy. You clearly want to scan "some
>>> time" after the write, from the principle of getting rid of malware
>>> that's on the disk, but it's unclear if this HAS to be synchronous.
>>> (obviously, synchronous behavior hurts performance bigtime so lets do
>>> as little as we can of that without hurting the protection).
>>> One advantage of doing the dirty case async (and a little time
> delayed)
>>> is that repeated writes will get lumped up into one scan in practice,
>>> saving a ton of performance.
>>> (scan-on-close is just another way of implementing "delay the dirty
>>> scan").
>>> Based on Alans comments, to me this sounds like we should have an
>>> efficient mechanism to notify userspace of "dirty events"; this is not
>>> virus scan specific in any way or form. And this mechanism likely will
>>> need to allow multiple subscribers.
>>
>> I'm certainly willing to go down the inotify'ish path for async
>> notification of 'dirty' inodes instead of implement my own async
>> mechanism if I can find a way to do it.
>
> Do I understand correctly that everyone agrees scanning whenever an inode
> gets dirty would be a terrible thing for performance?
>
> Another thing we have here is that malware could not be neccessariliy
> identified until the very last write (one example where it will always be
> the case are PDF files (I think)).
>
> So the whole question is at which point should be performing an async
> scan. Close seems like a natural point which should be ideal for majority
> of applications, I don't see how any time-based lumping/delaying scheme
> can be better than close?

all you need is the ability to mark a file as 'dirty', and some way for 
programs that are interested in dirty files learning about it later and 
decideing to do a scan. if the file gets dirtied again after they do they 
scan they will need to do another one (this is a classic trade-off between 
the 'security' of looking for things quickly or 'efficiancy' of only 
looking when you don't think they will change again. in other words, 
policy -> userspace)

David Lang
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