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Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2008 11:04:50 -0400 From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com> To: "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>, lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, SELinux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov> Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] selinux: add support for installing a dummy policy David P. Quigley wrote: > On Fri, 2008-08-22 at 14:34 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >> In August 2006 I posted a patch to the selinux list generating a minimal >> SELinux policy. This week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version >> of that as a patch against the kernel. In addition to some fixes, also >> had nice logic for auto-installing the policy. >> >> I've gone ahead and hooked it into the kernel Makefile logic. The way I >> have it here, doing 'make scripts' ends up compiling 'mdp', after which >> you must >> cd scripts/selinux >> sh install_policy.sh >> >> That isn't as nice as being able to do >> make selinux_install >> the way David had it, but it avoids mucking with the top-level >> Makefile. Which is preferred? >> >> In any case, this seems like a good thing to have in the kernel >> tree, to facilitate simple selinux boot tests. >> >> Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially >> bc it has stats on the generated policies): >> >> ====================================================================== >> For those interested in the changes there were only two significant >> changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes >> used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the >> class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place >> holders for the user space object classes. >> >> The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids >> table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration >> has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL. >> >> Some statistics on the policy that it generates: >> >> The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those >> 523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid >> definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy >> developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions. >> Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user >> statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first >> group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the >> second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27 >> lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11. >> >> In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts >> file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t. >> >> This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes. >> ====================================================================== >> (then a few versions later...): >> ====================================================================== >> The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those >> lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining >> 111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the >> allow rules (one for each object class including user space object >> classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for >> file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes. >> ====================================================================== >> >> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@...ibm.com> > > [Snip...] > > I'm not sure if I have to sign off on this but just in case. > > Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov> > > Dave > > > -- > This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@...ho.nsa.gov with > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. How easy would it be to go from this dummy policy to a policy that confined only one application? IE If I wanted to pull in the bind policy, what would be needed. This is a question that often comes up. I don't want anything confined except this one app? I would figure syslog would be a problem right off, others? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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