linux-kernel - Re: unprivileged mounts git tree

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Date:	Fri, 05 Sep 2008 00:26:27 +0200
From:	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>
To:	serue@...ibm.com
CC:	miklos@...redi.hu, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, hch@...radead.org,
	viro@...IV.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: unprivileged mounts git tree

On Thu, 4 Sep 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> We still have the original problem.
> 
> When root does
> 
> 	mount -bind /mnt /mnt
> 	mount --make-rshared /mnt
> 	mount --bind -o user=hallyn /mnt /home/hallyn/mnt
> 
> and hallyn does
> 
> 	mount --bind /usr /home/hallyn/mnt/usr
> 
> then the kernel happily propagates the mount to /mnt/usr.

Obviously, and that's exactly what root _instructed_ in the last step.
If it's a security problem, root shouldn't do that.

Your original bug report correctly pointed out the real security
problem:

|  as root:
|  	mmount --bind -o user=500 /home/hallyn/etc/ /home/hallyn/etc/
|  	mount --bind /mnt /mnt
|  	mount --make-rshared /mnt
|  	mount --bind /dev /mnt/dev
| 
|  as hallyn:
|  	mmount --bind /mnt /home/hallyn/etc/mnt
|  	/usr/src/mmount-0.3/mmount --bind mnt/dev mnt/src

Here root does nothing "unsafe", yet the user can get propagation back
into /mnt, due to the fact that a bind mount makes the new mount part
of the old peer group.  This is the security hole that is fixed, and
AFAICS the only security hole related to propagation vs. user mounts.

(I'm going to be offline tomorrow and the weekend, but will hopefully
have email access next week).

Thanks,
Miklos
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