linux-kernel - Re: [Labeled-nfs] [RFC v3] Security Label Support for NFSv4

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Date:	Tue, 14 Oct 2008 10:28:44 -0400
From:	"David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@....uio.no>
Cc:	"Matthew N. Dodd" <Matthew.Dodd@...rta.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, labeled-nfs@...ux-nfs.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [Labeled-nfs] [RFC v3] Security Label Support for NFSv4

On Tue, 2008-10-14 at 09:20 -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> On Mon, 2008-10-13 at 22:15 -0400, Matthew N. Dodd wrote:
> > James Morris wrote:
> > > On Mon, 29 Sep 2008, David P. Quigley wrote:
> > > 
> > >> 	* New security flavor (auth_seclabel) to transport process label to
> > >> 	  server. This is a derivative of auth_unix so it does not support
> > >> 	  kerberos which has its own issues that need to be dealt with.
> > > 
> > > This is a problem, as discussed last year:
> > > 
> > > http://linux-nfs.org/pipermail/labeled-nfs/2007-November/000110.html
> > > 
> > > We can't require the use of a new auth flavor which is incompatible with 
> > > auth_gss.
> > 
> > auth_seclabel demonstrates the flavor independent changes required for 
> > any RPC layer process label transport.  A GSS solution is currently 
> > under discussion.
> 
> Right, but I'm not particularly interested in merging "demonstration"
> code that might end up requiring permanent support. I'd very much like
> to see all of this get further through the IETF process before we talk
> about merging into mainline.
> 
> Cheers
>   Trond

Hello,
    Nico seems to have come up with a reasonable solution for this
problem we just need to sit down and draw up a document for it.
Apparently he already created a mechanism in rpcsec_gss for allowing you
to bind the rpc session to more than just the normal credentials. Once
we finalize this and get it into a draft we will work on implementing it
in the rpcsec_gss auth flavor.

Dave

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