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Date: Tue, 05 May 2009 10:58:10 +0200
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
Jake Edge <jake@....net>, security@...nel.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>, mingo@...hat.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com> writes:
>
> Looking forward:
>
> A faster-but-weakened RNG for ASLR (and similar purposes)
We really need it for the user space interface too, right now
recent glibc drains your entropy pool on every exec, and worse
recent kernels drain it now even with old glibc too. So any
system which doesn't have a active high frequency random number
source (which is most systems) doesn't have much real entropy
left for the applications that really need it.
-Andi (who always thought it was a bad idea to let ASLR weaken
your SSL/SSH session keys)
--
ak@...ux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.
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