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Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 12:20:15 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: your mail
* James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 7 May 2009, Chris Wright wrote:
>
> > * Ingo Molnar (mingo@...e.hu) wrote:
>
> [Added LSM list to the CC; please do so whenever making changes in this
> area...]
>
> > > They have no active connection to the core kernel
> > > ptrace_may_access() check in any case:
> >
> > Not sure what you mean:
> >
> > ptrace_may_access
> > __ptrace_may_access
> > security_ptrace_may_access
> >
> > Looks like your patch won't compile.
> >
>
> Below is an updated version which fixes the bug, against
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
>
> Boot tested with SELinux.
thanks! Below are the two patches i wrote and tested.
Ingo
----- Forwarded message from Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> -----
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 11:49:47 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Subject: [patch 1/2] ptrace, security: rename ptrace_may_access =>
ptrace_access_check
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
The ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - some
variants return a bool, while the security subsystem methods have a
retval convention.
Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. A
followup patch eliminates the bool usage.
[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090507084943.GB19133@...e.hu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
---
fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 10 +++++-----
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ptrace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 14 +++++++-------
kernel/ptrace.c | 10 +++++-----
security/capability.c | 2 +-
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++--
security/root_plug.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
12 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Index: linux/fs/proc/array.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/array.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
- permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ permitted = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
Index: linux/fs/proc/base.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/base.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct t
rcu_read_lock();
match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
+ if (match && ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
return 0;
}
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct tas
if (task->mm != mm)
goto out;
if (task->mm != current->mm &&
- __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
+ __ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
goto out;
task_unlock(task);
return mm;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_st
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return 0;
else
return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ allowed = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
Index: linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file
goto out;
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
goto out_task;
ret = -EINVAL;
Index: linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ extern void ptrace_fork(struct task_stru
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 1
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 2
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
-extern int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+extern int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
-extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+extern bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
{
Index: linux/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/security.h
+++ linux/include/linux/security.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
- * @ptrace_may_access:
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
* Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
* @child process.
* Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
* current process before allowing the current process to present itself
* to the @parent process for tracing.
- * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_may_access
+ * The parent process will still have to undergo the ptrace_access_check
* checks before it is allowed to trace this one.
* @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
struct security_operations {
char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
- int (*ptrace_may_access) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+ int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct
extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
/* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1798,10 +1798,10 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- return cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
}
static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
Index: linux/kernel/ptrace.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ linux/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_stru
return ret;
}
-int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -162,14 +162,14 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_stru
if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
- return security_ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+ return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
-bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
int err;
task_lock(task);
- err = __ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+ err = __ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
task_unlock(task);
return !err;
}
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ repeat:
/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto bad;
- retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ retval = __ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
if (retval)
goto bad;
Index: linux/security/capability.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/capability.c
+++ linux/security/capability.c
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ struct security_operations default_secur
void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
{
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c
+++ linux/security/commoncap.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
}
/**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
* another
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, str
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
Index: linux/security/root_plug.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/root_plug.c
+++ linux/security/root_plug.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
- .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = cap_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
Index: linux/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/security.c
+++ linux/security/security.c
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_op
/* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
- return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
}
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
Index: linux/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ linux/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1854,12 +1854,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -5318,7 +5318,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struc
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.name = "selinux",
- .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset = selinux_capset,
Index: linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
*/
/**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
* @ctp: child task pointer
* @mode: ptrace attachment mode
*
@@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char
*
* Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
*/
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
@@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *s
struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.name = "smack",
- .ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
.ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
--
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
----- End forwarded message -----
----- Forwarded message from Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> -----
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 11:50:54 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
Subject: [patch 2/2] ptrace: turn ptrace_access_check() into a retval
function
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Roland McGrath <roland@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
ptrace_access_check() returns a bool, while most of the ptrace
access check machinery works with Linux retvals (where 0 indicates
success, negative indicates an error).
So eliminate the bool and invert the usage at the call sites.
( Note: "< 0" checks are used instead of !0 checks, because that's
the convention for retval checks and it results in similarly fast
assembly code. )
[ Impact: cleanup ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
---
fs/proc/array.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 +-
kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++--
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Index: linux/fs/proc/array.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/array.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
- permitted = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ permitted = !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
Index: linux/fs/proc/base.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/base.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int check_mem_permission(struct t
rcu_read_lock();
match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (match && ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
+ if (match && !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
return 0;
}
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct task_st
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0)
- if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
return 0;
else
return sprintf(buffer, "%lu", wchan);
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ allowed = !ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
Index: linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ linux/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file
goto out;
ret = -EACCES;
- if (!ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
+ if (ptrace_access_check(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
goto out_task;
ret = -EINVAL;
Index: linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ linux/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ extern void ptrace_fork(struct task_stru
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
extern int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
-extern bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+extern int ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
{
Index: linux/kernel/ptrace.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ linux/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -165,13 +165,15 @@ int __ptrace_access_check(struct task_st
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
-bool ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+int ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
int err;
+
task_lock(task);
err = __ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
task_unlock(task);
- return !err;
+
+ return err;
}
int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
--
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----- End forwarded message -----
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