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Date:	Thu, 7 May 2009 23:53:34 -0700
From:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	joseph.cihula@...el.com
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...e.hu, arjan@...ux.intel.com,
	hpa@...or.com, andi@...stfloor.org, chrisw@...s-sol.org,
	jmorris@...ei.org, jbeulich@...ell.com, peterm@...hat.com,
	gang.wei@...el.com, shane.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v3][PATCH 2/2] intel_txt: Intel(R) TXT and tboot kernel
 support

On Thu, 07 May 2009 21:49:07 -0700 Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@...el.com> wrote:

> Linux support for Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology.
> 
> --- linux-2.6.30-rc4/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h	2009-04-29 21:48:16.000000000 -0700
> +++ linux-2.6.30-rc4-lkml/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h	2009-05-07 08:07:17.000000000 -0700
> @@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>  	FIX_WP_TEST,
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TXT
> +	FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE,
> +#endif

Curious.  Does this "shared" page get documented anywhere in the code?

It can't use ioremap() or early_ioremap()?

>  	__end_of_fixed_addresses
>  };
>  
>
> ...
>
> +struct tboot_uuid {
> +	u32    data1;
> +	u16    data2;
> +	u16    data3;
> +	u16    data4;
> +	u8     data5[6];
> +} __attribute__ ((__packed__));

Please use __packed everywhere.

> +/* used to communicate between tboot and the launched kernel */
> +
> +#define TB_KEY_SIZE             64   /* 512 bits */
> +
> +#define MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS      32
> +struct tboot_mac_region {
> +  u64  start;         /* must be 64 byte -aligned */
> +  u32  size;          /* must be 64 byte -granular */
> +} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
> +
> +/* GAS - Generic Address Structure (ACPI 2.0+) */
> +struct tboot_acpi_generic_address {
> +  u8  space_id;
> +  u8  bit_width;
> +  u8  bit_offset;
> +  u8  access_width;
> +  u64 address;
> +} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
> +
> +/* combines Sx info from FADT and FACS tables per ACPI 2.0+ spec
> +   (http://www.acpi.info/) */
> +struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info {
> +  struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_cnt_blk;
> +  struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_cnt_blk;
> +  struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1a_evt_blk;
> +  struct tboot_acpi_generic_address pm1b_evt_blk;
> +  u16 pm1a_cnt_val;
> +  u16 pm1b_cnt_val;
> +  u64 wakeup_vector;
> +  u32 vector_width;
> +  u64 kernel_s3_resume_vector;

Indenting broke in many places.

I didn't see a `depends on ACPI' in Kconfig.  Is it needed?

> +} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
> +
> +struct tboot_shared {
> +	/* version 3+ fields: */
> +	struct tboot_uuid uuid; /* TBOOT_SHARED_UUID */
> +	u32  version;      	/* Version number: 5 is current */
> +	u32  log_addr;     	/* physical addr of tb_log_t log */
> +	u32  shutdown_entry;	/* entry point for tboot shutdown */
> +	u32  shutdown_type;	/* type of shutdown (TB_SHUTDOWN_*) */
> +	struct tboot_acpi_sleep_info
> +		  acpi_sinfo;	/* where kernel put acpi sleep info in Sx */
> +	u32  tboot_base;	/* starting addr for tboot */
> +	u32  tboot_size;	/* size of tboot */
> +	u8   num_mac_regions;   /* number mem regions to MAC on S3 */
> +				/* contig regions memory to MAC on S3 */
> +	struct tboot_mac_region mac_regions[MAX_TB_MAC_REGIONS];
> +	/* version 4+ fields: */
> +				/* populated by tboot; will be encrypted */
> +	u8   s3_key[TB_KEY_SIZE];
> +	/* version 5+ fields: */
> +	u8   reserved_align[3]; /* used to 4byte-align num_in_wfs */
> +	u32  num_in_wfs;        /* number of processors in wait-for-SIPI */
> +} __attribute__ ((__packed__));
> +
> +/* UUID for tboot_shared data struct to facilitate matching */
> +/* {663C8DFF-E8B3-4b82-AABF-19EA4D057A08} */
> +#define TBOOT_SHARED_UUID     \
> +		((struct tboot_uuid){ 0x663c8dff, 0xe8b3, 0x4b82, 0xaabf,   \
> +				{ 0x19, 0xea, 0x4d, 0x5, 0x7a, 0x8 } })

Strange.  A

	static struct tboot_uuid uuid __initdata = { ... };

within tboot_probe() would suffice.

> +extern struct tboot_shared *tboot_shared;
> +
> +static inline int tboot_in_measured_env(void)
> +{
> +	return tboot_shared != NULL;
> +}
> +
>
> ...
>
> +
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/pfn.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/init_task.h>

a newline here is typical

> +#include <asm/pgtable.h>
> +#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> +#include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
> +#include <asm/setup.h>
> +#include <asm/io.h>
> +#include <asm/e820.h>
> +#include <asm/tboot.h>
> +
> +/* Global pointer to shared data; NULL means no measured launch. */
> +struct tboot_shared *tboot_shared __read_mostly;
> +
> +void __init tboot_probe(void)
> +{
> +	/* Look for valid page-aligned address for shared page. */
> +	if (boot_params.tboot_shared_addr == 0)
> +		return;
> +	/* also verify that it is mapped as we expect it before calling
> +	   set_fixmap(), to reduce chance of garbage value causing crash */
> +	if (!e820_any_mapped(boot_params.tboot_shared_addr,
> +			     boot_params.tboot_shared_addr, E820_UNUSABLE)) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: non-0 tboot_shared_addr but it is not of type E820_UNUSABLE\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* only a natively booted kernel should be using TXT */
> +	if (paravirt_enabled()) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: non-0 tboot_shared_addr but pv_ops is enabled\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Map and check for tboot UUID. */
> +	set_fixmap(FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE, boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);
> +	tboot_shared = (struct tboot_shared *)
> +				fix_to_virt(FIX_TBOOT_SHARED_BASE);
> +	if (memcmp(&TBOOT_SHARED_UUID, &tboot_shared->uuid,
> +		   sizeof(struct tboot_uuid))) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: tboot_shared at 0x%lx is invalid\n",
> +		       (unsigned long)boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);

That's a peculiar way of printing a u64, especially on 32 bit.

The code appears to be enabled for 32-bit.  Is that a
supported/tested/realistic combination?

> +		tboot_shared = NULL;
> +		return;
> +	}
> +	if (tboot_shared->version < 5) {
> +		printk(KERN_WARNING "TXT: tboot_shared version is invalid: %u\n",
> +		       tboot_shared->version);
> +		tboot_shared = NULL;
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	printk(KERN_INFO "TXT: found shared page at phys addr 0x%lx:\n",
> +	       (unsigned long)boot_params.tboot_shared_addr);
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT:  version: %d\n", tboot_shared->version);
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT:  log_addr: 0x%08x\n", tboot_shared->log_addr);
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT:  shutdown_entry: 0x%x\n",
> +	       tboot_shared->shutdown_entry);
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT:  tboot_base: 0x%08x\n",
> +	       tboot_shared->tboot_base);
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "TXT:  tboot_size: 0x%x\n",
> +	       tboot_shared->tboot_size);
> +}
> +
>
> ...
>
> +void tboot_shutdown(u32 shutdown_type)
> +{
> +	if (!tboot_in_measured_env())
> +		return;
> +
> +	/* if we're being called before the 1:1 mapping is set up then just
> +	   return and let the normal shutdown happen; this should only be
> +	   due to very early panic() */
> +	if (!tboot_pg_dir)
> +		return;
> +
> +	local_irq_disable();

Mystery local_irq_disable() needs a comment, methinks.

> +	/* if this is S3 then set regions to MAC */
> +	if (shutdown_type == TB_SHUTDOWN_S3) {
> +		tboot_shared->num_mac_regions = 3;
> +		/* S3 resume code */
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[0].start =
> +			PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(acpi_wakeup_address));
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[0].size =
> +			PFN_UP(WAKEUP_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		/* AP trampoline code */
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[1].start =
> +			PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(trampoline_base)));
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[1].size =
> +			PFN_UP(TRAMPOLINE_SIZE) << PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		/* kernel code + data + bss */
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[2].start =
> +			PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text)));
> +		tboot_shared->mac_regions[2].size =
> +			PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(virt_to_phys(&_end))) -
> +			PFN_PHYS(PFN_DOWN(virt_to_phys(&_text)));
> +	}
> +
> +	tboot_shared->shutdown_type = shutdown_type;
> +
> +	switch_to_tboot_pt();
> +
> +	((void(*)(void))(unsigned long)tboot_shared->shutdown_entry)();
> +
> +	/* should not reach here */
> +	while (1)
> +		halt();
> +}
> +
>
> ...
>
> +struct acpi_table_header *tboot_get_dmar_table(void)
> +{
> +	void *heap_base, *heap_ptr, *config;
> +	struct acpi_table_header *dmar_table;
> +
> +	/* ACPI tables may not be DMA protected by tboot, so use DMAR copy */
> +	/* SINIT saved in SinitMleData in TXT heap (which is DMA protected) */
> +
> +	/* map config space in order to get heap addr */
> +	config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, NR_TXT_CONFIG_PAGES *
> +			 PAGE_SIZE);
> +	if (config == NULL)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	/* now map TXT heap */
> +	heap_base = ioremap(*(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_BASE),
> +			    *(u64 *)(config + TXTCR_HEAP_SIZE));
> +	iounmap(config);
> +	if (heap_base == NULL)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	/* walk heap to SinitMleData */
> +	/* skip BiosData */
> +	heap_ptr = heap_base + *(u64 *)heap_base;
> +	/* skip OsMleData */
> +	heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr;
> +	/* skip OsSinitData */
> +	heap_ptr += *(u64 *)heap_ptr;
> +	/* now points to SinitMleDataSize; set to SinitMleData */
> +	heap_ptr += sizeof(u64);
> +	/* get addr of DMAR table */
> +	dmar_table = (struct acpi_table_header *)(heap_ptr +
> +			((struct sinit_mle_data *)heap_ptr)->vtd_dmars_off -
> +			  sizeof(u64));
> +
> +	/* don't unmap heap because dmar.c needs access to this */
> +
> +	return dmar_table;
> +}

This function trusts BIOS authors rather a lot.

>
> ...
>
> +config INTEL_TXT
> +        bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
> +        depends on EXPERIMENTAL && X86 && DMAR
> +        help
> +          This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
> +	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
> +          Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
> +	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
> +	  will have no effect.
> +
> +	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of sysem configuration and
> +	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
> +	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification.
> +
> +          See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
> +	  about Intel(R) TXT.
> +          See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
> +	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
> +	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
> +
> +          If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
> +

The help uses a mix of tab- and space-indenting which is why it looks
all messy when quoted.
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