linux-kernel - Re: module loading permissions and request

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Date:	Mon, 10 Aug 2009 19:25:51 -0400
From:	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
To:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, sds@...ho.nsa.gov,
	davem@...emloft.net, shemminger@...ux-foundation.org,
	kees@...ntu.com, morgan@...nel.org, serue@...ibm.com,
	casey@...aufler-ca.com, dwlash@...hat.com
Subject: Re: module loading permissions and request_module permission
	inconsistencies

On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 04:48:59PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Mon, 2009-08-10 at 16:23 -0400, Neil Horman wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 03:45:13PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> 
> > > 1) remove CAP_SYS_MODULE from the networking code and instead check
> > > CAP_NET_ADMIN.  Maybe CAP_NET_ADMIN is already being checked and I'll
> > > just remove the capable call altogether but at least I can more
> > > intelligently limit the powers of these processes and they will still be
> > > root limited according to DAC permissions like they are today.
> > > 
> > Would this have any adverse effect on how user space sees this working.
> > Intuitively I would think that if you wanted to load a module (directly or
> > indirectly, via an iptables command or whatnot), you would need CAP_SYS_MODULE
> > capabilities on the calling process, not just CAP_NET_ADMIN.  I honestly don't
> > know the answer here, I'm just raising the question.
> 
> While that might make intuitive sense, it's actually proving to be a bad
> idea to use the same capability for direct and indirect module loading
> (especially considering we have 125 other places in the kernel where you
> can do indirect module loading without any security check)  And believe
> me, if someone suggests I move a CAP_SYS_MODULE check down into
> __request_module I'll scream about what a horrible idea that is (and
> then laugh at them behind their back).
> 
> While I think there should be some check in __request_module I don't
> think it should be CAP_SYS_MODULE.
> 
Forgive my excessive density, but what exactly would be wrong with putting a
CAP_SYS_MODULE check into __request_module?  Is there some sort of implicit
behavioral change that will mess with user space in doing so?

> CAP_NET_ADMIN at least limits us to root and in all reality to the same
> situation everyone is in today.  I just checked every single selinux
> domain that grants CAP_SYS_MODULE already grants CAP_NET_ADMIN, so we
> can somewhat safely say that nothing (on a fedora system at least) would
> break with this change.
> 
Ok, well its definately good that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE
at the moment, but can we guarantee that in the future?  


Neil

> -Eric
> 
> 
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