linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86: Use __builtin_object_size to validate the buffer size for copy_from

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Date:	Sat, 26 Sep 2009 14:41:51 +0200
From:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To:	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...x.de, hpa@...or.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Use __builtin_object_size to validate the buffer
	size for copy_from_user


* Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org> wrote:

> From 524a1da3c45683cec77480acc6cab1d33ae8d5cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2009 12:36:21 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] x86: Use __builtin_object_size to validate the buffer size for copy_from_user
> 
> gcc (4.x) supports the __builtin_object_size() builtin, which reports the
> size of an object that a pointer point to, when known at compile time.
> If the buffer size is not known at compile time, a constant -1 is returned.
> 
> This patch uses this feature to add a sanity check to copy_from_user();
> if the target buffer is known to be smaller than the copy size, the copy
> is aborted and a WARNing is emitted in memory debug mode.
> 
> These extra checks compile away when the object size is not known,
> or if both the buffer size and the copy length are constants.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c  |    2 +-
>  arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S       |    4 ++--
>  arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c        |    4 ++--
>  include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h     |    2 ++
>  include/linux/compiler.h          |    4 ++++
>  7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

I have tested this on a buffer overflow and it caught it:

[   87.056952] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   87.061628] WARNING: at /home/mingo/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:35 sys_perf_counter_open+0x112/0x65b()
[   87.072600] Hardware name: System Product Name
[   87.077072] Buffer overflow detected!
[   87.080762] Modules linked in:
[   87.083858] Pid: 2670, comm: exploit Not tainted 2.6.31 #17235
[   87.089708] Call Trace:
[   87.092180]  [<ffffffff810a3241>] ? sys_perf_counter_open+0x112/0x65b
[   87.098654]  [<ffffffff8104303c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x77/0xa4
[   87.104684]  [<ffffffff810430b6>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3c/0x3e
[   87.110458]  [<ffffffff810e41c3>] ? putname+0x30/0x39
[   87.115570]  [<ffffffff810a3241>] sys_perf_counter_open+0x112/0x65b
[   87.121880]  [<ffffffff8105b6df>] ? up_read+0x9/0xb
[   87.126802]  [<ffffffff8100ba6b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[   87.132851] ---[ end trace 7469dba2cd3cfea8 ]---


> +static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to,
> +					  const void __user *from,
> +					  unsigned long n)
> +{
> +	int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to);
> +	int ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (likely(sz == -1 || sz >= n))
> +		ret = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> +	else
> +		WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected!\n");
> +#endif
> +	return ret;
> +}

This is pretty optimal in the !CONFIG_DEBUG_VM case. Would be nice to 
see precisely how optimal - how many new instructions in the default 
!CONFIG_DEBUG_VM case?


	Ingo
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