linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] [PATCH 1/7] User Space Breakpoint Assistance Layer (UBP)

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Date:	Sun, 17 Jan 2010 16:59:27 +0200
From:	Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>
To:	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CC:	ananth@...ibm.com, Jim Keniston <jkenisto@...ibm.com>,
	Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
	utrace-devel <utrace-devel@...hat.com>,
	Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...hat.com>,
	Maneesh Soni <maneesh@...ibm.com>,
	Mark Wielaard <mjw@...hat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] [PATCH 1/7] User Space Breakpoint Assistance Layer (UBP)

On 01/17/2010 04:52 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, 2010-01-17 at 16:39 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote:
>    
>> On 01/15/2010 11:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>      
>>> As previously stated, I think poking at a process's address space is an
>>> utter no-go.
>>>
>>>        
>> Why not reserve an address space range for this, somewhere near the top
>> of memory?  It doesn't have to be populated if it isn't used.
>>      
> Because I think poking at a process's address space like that is gross.
> Also, if its fixed size you're imposing artificial limits on the number
> of possible probes.
>    

btw, an alternative is to require the caller to provide the address 
space for this.  If the caller is in another process, we need to allow 
it to play with the target's address space (i.e. mmap_process()).  I 
don't think uprobes justifies this by itself, but mmap_process() can be 
very useful for sandboxing with seccomp.

-- 
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function

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