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Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:02:41 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
David Safford <safford@...son.ibm.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK
With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to
*file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of
the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 12 ++++++------
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++++---
5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6434f0d..6cd6dae 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description:
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
- base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+ base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK]
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
uid:= decimal value
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description:
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
- measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+ measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
- open for read by root in inode_permission.
+ open for read by root in do_filp_open.
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description:
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
- measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
- measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
Smack:
- measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c41afe6..4136bd8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 3cd58b6..2a5e0bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out:
* ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index bab392e..4fe6192 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
if (!iint)
return;
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
+ rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
- PATH_CHECK);
+ FILE_CHECK);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e127839..4759d0f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_func:
audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
- if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
- entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+ if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+ /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
--
1.6.0.6
--
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