linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, head

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Date:	Tue, 17 May 2011 03:10:06 +0100
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>
To:	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
Cc:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	H Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
	Asit K Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Avi Kivity <avi@...hat.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86, head_32/64.S: Enable SMEP

On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 02:34:44PM -0700, Fenghua Yu wrote:
> From: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
> 
> Enable newly documented SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection) CPU
> feature in kernel.
> 
> SMEP prevents the CPU in kernel-mode to jump to an executable page that does
> not have the kernel/system flag set in the pte. This prevents the kernel
> from executing user-space code accidentally or maliciously, so it for example
> prevents kernel exploits from jumping to specially prepared user-mode shell
> code. The violation will cause page fault #PF and will have error code
> identical to XD violation.

Are EFI runtime service pages currently set up appropriately?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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