linux-kernel - Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

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Date:	Wed, 5 Oct 2011 22:50:24 +0300
From:	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>
To:	Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@...hat.com>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 10:23:49PM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 01:06:16PM -0400, Ted Ts'o wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 10:54:39AM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote:
> > > 
> > > What policy is now used at kernel.org now is exactly the question
> > > I asked in [1], and where I'm still waiting for an answer from hpa.
> > > 
> > > Other organizations like Debian have a clear and public policy on 
> > > what is required for the user identification part for uploading to
> > > the archive [2], and I expect the same for kernel.org.
> > 
> > Peter has already said "are you prepared to swear in court".
> > Government issued ID is one way (although any US high school student
> > knows how easy it is to get fake ID); personal knowledge of someone's
> > speach patterns plus common history generated by years of talking to
> > that person at conferences and/or concalls, is another way.
> > 
> > When I bootstrapped Linus's key, he and I talked on the phone, and I
> > knew him well enough by our conversation my recognizing his speach
> > patterns that I was prepared to certify his key even though I've never
> > seen his government ID.  That being said, I also know and trust Jim
> > Zemlin well enough to know trust that the person employed by the Linux
> > Foundation had his ID and right to work checked per US employment law,
> > and and that the person I talked to was the same person who is
> > employed by the Linux Foundation.  Realistically, I'm far more sure of
> > Linus's identity than I would be of some random Debian developer who
> > got his key signed after some quick impromptu verification of what
> > appeared to be a governement-issued ID at some conference.  :-)
> 
> That was not what I was talking about in the email you are answering to.
> 
> Let me paraphrase my question:
> "Whose signatures do I need on my key so that it will be accepted
>  at kernel.org?"
> 
> With that information I can check if one email to a few local people to 
> have a local keysigning is enough.
> 
> Or if I have to bother Linus to meet me and sign my key the next
> time he is here in Helsinki.

Or even one step further:
Perhaps my old existing key is good enough?

- It is in the Debian emeritus keyring.
- The fingerprint is in CREDITS of the kernel since 2.6.10 in 2004.
- The fingerprint was in the context of the commit when I updated
  my CREDITS entry in 2008.
- In the unlikely case that an intruder is on my system, he will
  anyway get my new key and passphrase immediately. [1]

cu
Adrian

[1] I did check what Greg recommended in his email, but I'm not gonna 
    wipe my complete installation (including wiping /home) unless 
    someone can point at something indicating that there's a break-in
    at my machine.

-- 

       "Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
        of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
       "Only a promise," Lao Er said.
                                       Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed

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