linux-kernel - Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

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Date:	Fri, 07 Oct 2011 14:22:52 -0400
From:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To:	Arnaud Lacombe <lacombar@...il.com>
Cc:	Krzysztof Halasa <khc@...waw.pl>,
	Jon Masters <jonathan@...masters.org>,
	Adrian Bunk <bunk@...sta.de>,
	"Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...e.de>
Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

On Fri, 07 Oct 2011 12:59:30 EDT, Arnaud Lacombe said:

> How so ? The public key BOb has is mathematically tied to the private
> key Alice has. If Bob sends Alice a mail, and then, she send a reply
> signed with her key, which is tied to the mail address used by Bob.
> Then, Bob successfully verifies the signature. This proves Alice has
> control over the key tied and the mail address, don't it ? 

As I said - yes, that *DOES* prove control over key and email address.

The point is that signing something random does not prove anything about
control of the *KEY ONLY* that isn't also proved by using the key to sign
another key.


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