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Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2012 07:18:24 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
David Safford <safford@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/12] ima: integrity appraisal extension
On Mon, 2012-04-02 at 10:20 +0300, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 5:41 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the
> > integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal
> > extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the
> > measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute
> > 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are
> > hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature
> > based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides
> > authenticity.
> >
> > This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing
> > the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by
> > EVM, if enabled and configured.
> >
> > Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata
> > integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value
> > with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'.
> >
> > Changelog v3:
> > - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail
> >
> > Changelog v2:
> > - fix audit msg 'res' value
> > - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values
> >
> > Changelog v1:
> > - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr
> > (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the
> > 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS).
> > - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA
> > - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
> > (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c)
> > - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file
> >
> > Changelog:
> > - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin)
> > - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then
> > iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take
> > the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin)
> > - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but
> > only for those measured/appraised.
> > - don't try to appraise new/empty files
> > - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig
> > - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled
> > - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub
> > - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status,
> > not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
>
> Mimi forgot to add:
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Sorry, thanks for catching it.
Mimi
> > ---
> > Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +
> > include/linux/xattr.h | 3 +
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 +
> > security/integrity/iint.c | 3 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 15 +++
> > security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +
> > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 37 +++++++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 50 +++++++---
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 8 ++-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 78 ++++++++++-----
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++--
> > security/integrity/integrity.h | 8 +-
> > 13 files changed, 358 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index 033d4e6..a86765d 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -1004,6 +1004,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
> > ihash_entries= [KNL]
> > Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
> >
> > + ima_appraise= [IMA] appraise integrity measurements
> > + Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "fix" }
> > + default: "enforce"
> > +
> > ima_audit= [IMA]
> > Format: { "0" | "1" }
> > 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
> > index e5d1220..77a3e68 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/xattr.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
> > @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
> > #define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
> > #define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
> >
> > +#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima"
> > +#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX
> > +
> > #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
> > #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > index 8901501..eb54845 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> > XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
> > #endif
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
> > + XATTR_NAME_IMA,
> > +#endif
> > XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> > NULL
> > };
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > index 399641c..e600986 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
> > {
> > iint->version = 0;
> > iint->flags = 0UL;
> > + iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
> > }
> > @@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
> > memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
> > iint->version = 0;
> > iint->flags = 0UL;
> > - mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
> > + iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > index 35664fe..b7465a1 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> > @@ -54,3 +54,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
> > default y
> > help
> > Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
> > +
> > +config IMA_APPRAISE
> > + bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
> > + depends on IMA
> > + default n
> > + help
> > + This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
> > + It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
> > + attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect
> > + the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
> > + and configure EVM.
> > +
> > + For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
> > + <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
> > + If unsure, say N.
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> > index 5690c02..bd31516 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
> > @@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
> >
> > ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
> > ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
> > +
> > +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > index 3ccf7ac..d5bf463 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> > @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
> > extern int ima_initialized;
> > extern int ima_used_chip;
> > extern char *ima_hash;
> > +extern int ima_appraise;
> >
> > /* IMA inode template definition */
> > struct ima_template_data {
> > @@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
> > }
> >
> > /* LIM API function definitions */
> > +int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
> > int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
> > int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > struct file *file);
> > @@ -114,14 +116,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
> > struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
> >
> > /* IMA policy related functions */
> > -enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
> > +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
> >
> > -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
> > +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> > + int flags);
> > void ima_init_policy(void);
> > void ima_update_policy(void);
> > ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
> > void ima_delete_rules(void);
> >
> > +/* Appraise integrity measurements */
> > +#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
> > +#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
> > +int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
> > +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
> > +void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
> > +
> > +#else
> > +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > + struct file *file,
> > + const unsigned char *filename)
> > +{
> > + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode,
> > + enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > + struct file *file)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
> > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > index 88a2788..55deeb1 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > @@ -9,13 +9,17 @@
> > * License.
> > *
> > * File: ima_api.c
> > - * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
> > - * and store_template.
> > + * Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
> > + * appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
> > */
> > #include <linux/module.h>
> > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > -
> > +#include <linux/file.h>
> > +#include <linux/fs.h>
> > +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> > +#include <linux/evm.h>
> > #include "ima.h"
> > +
> > static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ err_out:
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > - * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
> > + * ima_must_appraise_or_measure - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
> > * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
> > * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
> > * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
> > @@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ err_out:
> > * mask: contains the permission mask
> > * fsmagic: hex value
> > *
> > - * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
> > - * or other error, return an error code.
> > -*/
> > -int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
> > + * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
> > {
> > - int must_measure;
> > + int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE;
> > +
> > + if (!ima_appraise)
> > + flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
> > +
> > + return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
> > +}
> >
> > - must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
> > - return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
> > +int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
> > +{
> > + return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
> > int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > struct file *file)
> > {
> > - int result = -EEXIST;
> > + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> > + const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
> > + int result = 0;
> >
> > - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
> > + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
> > u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
> >
> > memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
> > - if (!result)
> > + if (!result) {
> > iint->version = i_version;
> > + iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
> > + }
> > }
> > + if (result)
> > + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
> > + filename, "collect_data", "failed",
> > + result, 0);
> > return result;
> > }
> >
> > @@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > struct ima_template_entry *entry;
> > int violation = 0;
> >
> > + if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
> > + return;
> > +
> > entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (!entry) {
> > integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000..4865f61
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
> > + *
> > + * Author:
> > + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
> > + *
> > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> > + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> > + */
> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > +#include <linux/file.h>
> > +#include <linux/fs.h>
> > +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> > +#include <linux/magic.h>
> > +#include <linux/ima.h>
> > +#include <linux/evm.h>
> > +
> > +#include "ima.h"
> > +
> > +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
> > +{
> > + if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> > + ima_appraise = 0;
> > + else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
> > + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
> > + return 1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
> > + *
> > + * Return 1 to appraise
> > + */
> > +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
> > +{
> > + iint->digest[0] = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
> > + __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA,
> > + iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
> > + *
> > + * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
> > + * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
> > + *
> > + * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
> > + */
> > +int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
> > +{
> > + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
> > + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > + u8 xattr_value[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > + enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > + const char *op = "appraise_data";
> > + char *cause = "unknown";
> > + int rc;
> > +
> > + if (!ima_appraise)
> > + return 0;
> > + if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
> > + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > +
> > + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
> > + return iint->ima_status;
> > +
> > + rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
> > + IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > + if (rc <= 0) {
> > + if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + cause = "missing-hash";
> > + status =
> > + (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> > + if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> > + if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> > + || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> > + cause = "missing-HMAC";
> > + else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
> > + cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + rc = memcmp(xattr_value, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > + if (rc) {
> > + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
> > + cause = "invalid-hash";
> > + print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > + xattr_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > + print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > + iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > + status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> > + iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
> > +out:
> > + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
> > + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) {
> > + ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
> > + status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> > + }
> > + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
> > + op, cause, rc, 0);
> > + }
> > + iint->ima_status = status;
> > + return status;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
> > + */
> > +void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
> > +{
> > + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
> > + int rc = 0;
> > +
> > + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
> > + if (rc < 0)
> > + return;
> > + ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
> > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > + *
> > + * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
> > + *
> > + * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
> > + * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
> > + */
> > +void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
> > +{
> > + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> > + int must_appraise, rc;
> > +
> > + if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
> > + || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
> > + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
> > + if (iint) {
> > + if (must_appraise)
> > + iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
> > + else
> > + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
> > + }
> > + if (!must_appraise)
> > + rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
> > + return;
> > +}
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > index 9b3ade7..b21ee5b 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
> > struct scatterlist sg[1];
> > loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
> > char *rbuf;
> > - int rc;
> > + int rc, read = 0;
> >
> > rc = init_desc(&desc);
> > if (rc != 0)
> > @@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
> > rc = -ENOMEM;
> > goto out;
> > }
> > + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
> > + file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
> > + read = 1;
> > + }
> > i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
> > while (offset < i_size) {
> > int rbuf_len;
> > @@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
> > kfree(rbuf);
> > if (!rc)
> > rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
> > + if (read)
> > + file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
> > out:
> > crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
> > return rc;
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 5b222eb..fba2f7b 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -22,12 +22,19 @@
> > #include <linux/mount.h>
> > #include <linux/mman.h>
> > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > +#include <linux/xattr.h>
> > #include <linux/ima.h>
> >
> > #include "ima.h"
> >
> > int ima_initialized;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
> > +int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
> > +#else
> > +int ima_appraise;
> > +#endif
> > +
> > char *ima_hash = "sha1";
> > static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
> > {
> > @@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
> > struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
> > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
> > - int rc;
> > + int must_measure;
> > bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
> >
> > if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
> > @@ -66,8 +73,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > - rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
> > - if (rc < 0)
> > + must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
> > + if (!must_measure)
> > goto out;
> >
> > if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
> > @@ -84,17 +91,21 @@ out:
> > }
> >
> > static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > - struct inode *inode,
> > - struct file *file)
> > + struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> > {
> > fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
> >
> > - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
> > - if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
> > - atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
> > - iint->version != inode->i_version)
> > - iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
> > - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
> > + if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
> > + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
> > + iint->version != inode->i_version) {
> > + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
> > + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
> > + ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
> > + }
> > + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -123,14 +134,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> > {
> > struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
> > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
> > - int rc = 0;
> > + int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
> >
> > if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
> > return 0;
> >
> > - rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
> > - if (rc != 0)
> > - return rc;
> > + /* Determine if in appraise/measurement policy,
> > + * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE bitmask. */
> > + action = ima_must_appraise_or_measure(inode, mask, function);
> > + if (!action)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > retry:
> > iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
> > if (!iint) {
> > @@ -140,18 +154,32 @@ retry:
> > return rc;
> > }
> >
> > - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
> > + must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
> >
> > - rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
> > - if (rc != 0)
> > + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
> > +
> > + /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
> > + * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED) */
> > + iint->flags |= action;
> > + action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED)) >> 1);
> > +
> > + /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
> > + if (!action) {
> > + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
> > + rc = iint->ima_status;
> > goto out;
> > + }
> >
> > rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
> > - if (!rc)
> > + if (rc != 0)
> > + goto out;
> > + if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
> > ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
> > + if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
> > + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file, filename);
> > out:
> > - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
> > - return rc;
> > + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
> > + return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -167,14 +195,14 @@ out:
> > */
> > int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> > {
> > - int rc;
> > + int rc = 0;
> >
> > if (!file)
> > return 0;
> > if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
> > rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
> > MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
> > - return 0;
> > + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_mmap);
> >
> > @@ -197,7 +225,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> >
> > rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
> > MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> > - return 0;
> > + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -218,7 +246,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> > rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
> > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
> > FILE_CHECK);
> > - return 0;
> > + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index d8edff2..8ee301c 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -25,7 +25,13 @@
> > #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> > #define IMA_UID 0x0008
> >
> > -enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
> > +#define UNKNOWN 0
> > +#define MEASURE 1 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
> > +#define DONT_MEASURE 2
> > +#define MEASURE_MASK 3
> > +#define APPRAISE 4 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
> > +#define DONT_APPRAISE 8
> > +#define APPRAISE_MASK 12
> >
> > #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
> > enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
> > @@ -34,7 +40,7 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
> >
> > struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
> > struct list_head list;
> > - enum ima_action action;
> > + int action;
> > unsigned int flags;
> > enum ima_hooks func;
> > int mask;
> > @@ -161,18 +167,28 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
> > * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
> > * change.)
> > */
> > -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> > +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> > + int flags)
> > {
> > struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
> > + int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
> >
> > list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
> > - bool rc;
> >
> > - rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
> > - if (rc)
> > - return entry->action;
> > + if (!(entry->action & actmask))
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + action |= (entry->action & (IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_MEASURE));
> > + actmask &= (entry->action & APPRAISE_MASK) ?
> > + ~APPRAISE_MASK : ~MEASURE_MASK;
> > + if (!actmask)
> > + break;
> > }
> > - return 0;
> > +
> > + return action;
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > index 7a25ece..295702d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > @@ -16,7 +16,11 @@
> > #include <crypto/sha.h>
> >
> > /* iint cache flags */
> > -#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01
> > +#define IMA_MEASURE 1
> > +#define IMA_MEASURED 2
> > +#define IMA_APPRAISE 4
> > +#define IMA_APPRAISED 8
> > +#define IMA_COLLECTED 16
> >
> > enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
> > IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
> > @@ -36,7 +40,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
> > u64 version; /* track inode changes */
> > unsigned char flags;
> > u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > - struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
> > + enum integrity_status ima_status;
> > enum integrity_status evm_status;
> > };
--
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