linux-kernel - Re: Use PCI ROMs from EFI boot services

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Date:	Thu, 6 Dec 2012 06:19:03 +0000
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:	Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, mfleming@...el.com, dwmw2@...radead.org,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: Use PCI ROMs from EFI boot services

On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 05:21:44PM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 12/05/2012 05:13 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >Yeah, it needs to be hidden from root - but ideally we'd be passing it to the second kernel if we kexec. Alternative would be for it to be capability bounded to a trusted signed kexec binary if we implement Vivek's IMA-based approach.
> >
> 
> Either way a security flag in the type field makes sense.

I've no objection to that, although I'm not sure there's any real reason 
to expose an incomplete setup_data to userspace. Any scenario in which 
kexec can't read the full data is one where kexec won't be able to 
call sys_kexec() anyway.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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