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Date: Mon, 07 Jan 2013 18:09:17 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
CC: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v12 3/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
Subject: [PATCH v12 3/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
Change the infrastructure for Linux Security Modules (LSM)s
from a single vector of hook handlers to a list based method
for handling multiple concurrent modules.
Handle any preconditions in the hooks directly.
Treat allocation and procattr hooks specially.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 1496 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 1191 insertions(+), 305 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index daa97f4..72bf9dc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -25,30 +25,287 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <linux/lsm.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
+#define PRESENT_FIRST "FIRSTLSM"
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
- CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
-static struct security_operations *security_ops;
-static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
- .name = "default",
-};
+static __initdata char specified_lsms[COMPOSER_MAX][SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+static __initdata char allowed_lsms[COMPOSER_NAMES_MAX];
+static __initdata char present_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
+ CONFIG_PRESENT_SECURITY;
-static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops)
+struct list_head lsm_hooks[LSM_MAX_HOOKS];
+struct security_operations *lsm_present;
+
+static int (*present_getprocattr)
+ (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
+static int (*present_setprocattr)
+ (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+
+static int lsm_count;
+
+#define for_each_hook(SOP, HOOK) \
+ list_for_each_entry(SOP, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##HOOK], list[lsm_##HOOK])
+
+/*
+ * Add an entry to a list of security operation vectors.
+ * The "interesting" logic is included here rather than in the
+ * caller to reduce the volume of the calling code.
+ */
+static void __init lsm_enlist(struct security_operations *ops,
+ const enum lsm_hooks_index index,
+ void *interesting)
{
- /* verify the security_operations structure exists */
- if (!ops)
- return -EINVAL;
- security_fixup_ops(ops);
- return 0;
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+
+ if (!interesting) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops->list[index]);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (list_empty(&lsm_hooks[index])) {
+ list_add_rcu(&ops->list[index], &lsm_hooks[index]);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[index], list[index]) {
+ if (ops->order < sop->order) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&ops->list[index], &sop->list[index]);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (list_is_last(&sop->list[index], &lsm_hooks[index])) {
+ list_add_rcu(&ops->list[index], &sop->list[index]);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_enlist_ops(struct security_operations *sop)
+{
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_ptrace_access_check, sop->ptrace_access_check);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_ptrace_traceme, sop->ptrace_traceme);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_capget, sop->capget);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_capset, sop->capset);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_capable, sop->capable);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_quotactl, sop->quotactl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_quota_on, sop->quota_on);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_syslog, sop->syslog);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_settime, sop->settime);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_vm_enough_memory, sop->vm_enough_memory);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_bprm_set_creds, sop->bprm_set_creds);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_bprm_check_security, sop->bprm_check_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_bprm_committing_creds, sop->bprm_committing_creds);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_bprm_committed_creds, sop->bprm_committed_creds);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_bprm_secureexec, sop->bprm_secureexec);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_alloc_security, sop->sb_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_free_security, sop->sb_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_copy_data, sop->sb_copy_data);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_remount, sop->sb_remount);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_kern_mount, sop->sb_kern_mount);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_show_options, sop->sb_show_options);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_statfs, sop->sb_statfs);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_mount, sop->sb_mount);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_umount, sop->sb_umount);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_pivotroot, sop->sb_pivotroot);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_set_mnt_opts, sop->sb_set_mnt_opts);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_clone_mnt_opts, sop->sb_clone_mnt_opts);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sb_parse_opts_str, sop->sb_parse_opts_str);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_alloc_security, sop->inode_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_free_security, sop->inode_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_init_security, sop->inode_init_security);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_mknod, sop->path_mknod);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_mkdir, sop->path_mkdir);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_rmdir, sop->path_rmdir);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_unlink, sop->path_unlink);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_symlink, sop->path_symlink);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_link, sop->path_link);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_rename, sop->path_rename);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_truncate, sop->path_truncate);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_chmod, sop->path_chmod);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_chown, sop->path_chown);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_path_chroot, sop->path_chroot);
+#endif
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_create, sop->inode_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_link, sop->inode_link);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_unlink, sop->inode_unlink);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_symlink, sop->inode_symlink);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_mkdir, sop->inode_mkdir);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_rmdir, sop->inode_rmdir);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_mknod, sop->inode_mknod);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_rename, sop->inode_rename);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_readlink, sop->inode_readlink);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_follow_link, sop->inode_follow_link);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_permission, sop->inode_permission);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_setattr, sop->inode_setattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_getattr, sop->inode_getattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_setxattr, sop->inode_setxattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_post_setxattr, sop->inode_post_setxattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_getxattr, sop->inode_getxattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_listxattr, sop->inode_listxattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_removexattr, sop->inode_removexattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_need_killpriv, sop->inode_need_killpriv);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_killpriv, sop->inode_killpriv);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_getsecurity, sop->inode_getsecurity);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_setsecurity, sop->inode_setsecurity);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_listsecurity, sop->inode_listsecurity);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_getsecid, sop->inode_getsecid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_permission, sop->file_permission);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_alloc_security, sop->file_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_free_security, sop->file_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_ioctl, sop->file_ioctl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_mmap_file, sop->mmap_file);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_mmap_addr, sop->mmap_addr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_mprotect, sop->file_mprotect);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_lock, sop->file_lock);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_fcntl, sop->file_fcntl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_set_fowner, sop->file_set_fowner);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_send_sigiotask, sop->file_send_sigiotask);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_receive, sop->file_receive);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_file_open, sop->file_open);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_create, sop->task_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_free, sop->task_free);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_cred_alloc_blank, sop->cred_alloc_blank);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_cred_free, sop->cred_free);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_cred_prepare, sop->cred_prepare);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_cred_transfer, sop->cred_transfer);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_kernel_act_as, sop->kernel_act_as);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_kernel_create_files_as,
+ sop->kernel_create_files_as);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_kernel_module_request, sop->kernel_module_request);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_kernel_module_from_file,
+ sop->kernel_module_from_file);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_fix_setuid, sop->task_fix_setuid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_setpgid, sop->task_setpgid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_getpgid, sop->task_getpgid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_getsid, sop->task_getsid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_getsecid, sop->task_getsecid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_setnice, sop->task_setnice);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_setioprio, sop->task_setioprio);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_getioprio, sop->task_getioprio);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_setrlimit, sop->task_setrlimit);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_setscheduler, sop->task_setscheduler);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_getscheduler, sop->task_getscheduler);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_movememory, sop->task_movememory);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_kill, sop->task_kill);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_wait, sop->task_wait);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_prctl, sop->task_prctl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_task_to_inode, sop->task_to_inode);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_ipc_permission, sop->ipc_permission);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_ipc_getsecid, sop->ipc_getsecid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+ sop->msg_msg_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_msg_free_security, sop->msg_msg_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+ sop->msg_queue_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_free_security,
+ sop->msg_queue_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_associate, sop->msg_queue_associate);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_msgctl, sop->msg_queue_msgctl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_msgsnd, sop->msg_queue_msgsnd);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_msg_queue_msgrcv, sop->msg_queue_msgrcv);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_shm_alloc_security, sop->shm_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_shm_free_security, sop->shm_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_shm_associate, sop->shm_associate);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_shm_shmctl, sop->shm_shmctl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_shm_shmat, sop->shm_shmat);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sem_alloc_security, sop->sem_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sem_free_security, sop->sem_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sem_associate, sop->sem_associate);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sem_semctl, sop->sem_semctl);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sem_semop, sop->sem_semop);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_d_instantiate, sop->d_instantiate);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_getprocattr, sop->getprocattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_setprocattr, sop->setprocattr);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_netlink_send, sop->netlink_send);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_secid_to_secctx, sop->secid_to_secctx);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_secctx_to_secid, sop->secctx_to_secid);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_release_secctx, sop->release_secctx);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_notifysecctx, sop->inode_notifysecctx);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_setsecctx, sop->inode_setsecctx);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inode_getsecctx, sop->inode_getsecctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_unix_stream_connect, sop->unix_stream_connect);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_unix_may_send, sop->unix_may_send);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_create, sop->socket_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_post_create, sop->socket_post_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_bind, sop->socket_bind);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_connect, sop->socket_connect);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_listen, sop->socket_listen);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_accept, sop->socket_accept);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_sendmsg, sop->socket_sendmsg);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_recvmsg, sop->socket_recvmsg);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_getsockname, sop->socket_getsockname);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_getpeername, sop->socket_getpeername);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_getsockopt, sop->socket_getsockopt);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_setsockopt, sop->socket_setsockopt);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_shutdown, sop->socket_shutdown);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_sock_rcv_skb, sop->socket_sock_rcv_skb);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ sop->socket_getpeersec_stream);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+ sop->socket_getpeersec_dgram);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sk_alloc_security, sop->sk_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sk_free_security, sop->sk_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sk_clone_security, sop->sk_clone_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_req_classify_flow, sop->req_classify_flow);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_sock_graft, sop->sock_graft);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inet_conn_request, sop->inet_conn_request);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inet_csk_clone, sop->inet_csk_clone);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_inet_conn_established, sop->inet_conn_established);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_secmark_relabel_packet,
+ sop->secmark_relabel_packet);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_secmark_refcount_inc, sop->secmark_refcount_inc);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_secmark_refcount_dec, sop->secmark_refcount_dec);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_tun_dev_create, sop->tun_dev_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_tun_dev_post_create, sop->tun_dev_post_create);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_tun_dev_attach, sop->tun_dev_attach);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_policy_alloc_security,
+ sop->xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_policy_clone_security,
+ sop->xfrm_policy_clone_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_policy_free_security,
+ sop->xfrm_policy_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_policy_delete_security,
+ sop->xfrm_policy_delete_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_state_alloc_security,
+ sop->xfrm_state_alloc_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_state_delete_security,
+ sop->xfrm_state_delete_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_state_free_security,
+ sop->xfrm_state_free_security);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_policy_lookup, sop->xfrm_policy_lookup);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ sop->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_xfrm_decode_session, sop->xfrm_decode_session);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_key_alloc, sop->key_alloc);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_key_free, sop->key_free);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_key_permission, sop->key_permission);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_key_getsecurity, sop->key_getsecurity);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_audit_rule_init, sop->audit_rule_init);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_audit_rule_known, sop->audit_rule_known);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_audit_rule_free, sop->audit_rule_free);
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_audit_rule_match, sop->audit_rule_match);
+#endif
+
+ lsm_enlist(sop, lsm_name, sop->name);
}
static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
{
initcall_t *call;
+
call = __security_initcall_start;
while (call < __security_initcall_end) {
(*call) ();
@@ -63,24 +320,71 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
*/
int __init security_init(void)
{
- printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n");
+ enum lsm_hooks_index i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSM_MAX_HOOKS; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&lsm_hooks[i]);
+
+ pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
- security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops);
- security_ops = &default_security_ops;
do_security_initcalls();
return 0;
}
-void reset_security_ops(void)
+/*
+ * Only SELinux calls reset_security_ops.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+
+static void lsm_delist_ops(struct security_operations *sop)
{
- security_ops = &default_security_ops;
+ enum lsm_hooks_index i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSM_MAX_HOOKS; i++)
+ if (sop->list[i].next && !list_empty(&sop->list[i]))
+ list_del_rcu(&sop->list[i]);
+ return;
}
-/* Save user chosen LSM */
+int reset_security_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ /*
+ * This LSM is configured to own /proc/.../attr.
+ */
+ if (lsm_present == ops)
+ lsm_present = NULL;
+
+ lsm_delist_ops(ops);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
+
+/* Save user chosen LSM(s) */
static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
{
- strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ char *cp;
+ char *ep;
+ int i;
+
+ strncpy(allowed_lsms, str, COMPOSER_NAMES_MAX);
+ cp = allowed_lsms;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < COMPOSER_MAX; i++) {
+ ep = strchr(cp, ',');
+ if (ep != NULL)
+ *ep = '\0';
+ if (strlen(cp) > SECURITY_NAME_MAX)
+ pr_warn("LSM \"%s\" is invalid and ignored.\n", cp);
+ else
+ strncpy(specified_lsms[i], cp, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ if (ep == NULL)
+ break;
+ cp = ep + 1;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
@@ -94,74 +398,303 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
* to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
*
* Return true if:
- * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- * -or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- * choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
+ * -The passed LSM is on the list of LSMs specified at boot time,
+ * -or no boot list was specified.
* Otherwise, return false.
*/
int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
{
- return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm);
-}
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ int i;
-/**
- * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
- *
- * This function allows a security module to register itself with the
- * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
- * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
- * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
- *
- * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
- * an error will be returned. Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
- */
-int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
- if (verify(ops)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
- "security_operations structure.\n", __func__);
- return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Set up the operation vector early, but only once.
+ * This allows LSM specific file systems to check to see if they
+ * should come on line.
+ */
+ if (ops == NULL) {
+ pr_debug("%s could not verify security_operations.\n",
+ __func__);
+ return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Return success if the LSM is already resistered
+ */
+ for_each_hook(sop, name)
+ if (sop == ops)
+ return 1;
- if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
- return -EAGAIN;
+ /*
+ * This LSM has not yet been ordered.
+ */
+ ops->order = -1;
- security_ops = ops;
+ if (lsm_count >= COMPOSER_MAX) {
+ pr_warn("Too many security modules. %s not loaded.\n",
+ ops->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
- return 0;
+ if (specified_lsms[0][0] != '\0') {
+ for (i = 0; specified_lsms[i][0] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(ops->name, specified_lsms[i]) == 0) {
+ ops->order = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ops->order == -1) {
+ pr_notice("LSM %s declined by boot options.\n",
+ ops->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for conflicting LSMs.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ if (ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security &&
+ !list_empty(&lsm_hooks[lsm_xfrm_policy_alloc_security])) {
+ pr_warn("LSM conflict on %s. %s not loaded.\n",
+ "xfrm_policy_alloc_security", ops->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (ops->secid_to_secctx &&
+ !list_empty(&lsm_hooks[lsm_secid_to_secctx])) {
+ pr_warn("LSM conflict on %s. %s not loaded.\n",
+ "secid_to_secctx", ops->name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The order will already be set if the command line
+ * includes "security=".
+ *
+ * Do this before the enlisting. If there is an error
+ * (Very unlikely!) that prevents the enlisting from
+ * completing it is still necessary to have a blob slot
+ * for it.
+ */
+ if (ops->order == -1)
+ ops->order = lsm_count;
+ lsm_count++;
+
+ /*
+ * Use the LSM specified by CONFIG_SECURITY_PRESENT for
+ * [gs]etprocattr. If the LSM specified is PRESENT_FIRST
+ * use the first LSM to register that has the hooks.
+ * If the specified LSM lacks the hooks treat it as if
+ * there is no LSM registered that supplied them.
+ */
+ if (ops->getprocattr && ops->setprocattr &&
+ (!strcmp(ops->name, present_lsm) ||
+ (!lsm_present && !strcmp(PRESENT_FIRST, present_lsm)))) {
+ lsm_present = ops;
+ present_getprocattr = ops->getprocattr;
+ present_setprocattr = ops->setprocattr;
+ pr_info("Security Module %s is presented in /proc.\n",
+ ops->name);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Return success after registering the LSM.
+ */
+ lsm_enlist_ops(ops);
+
+ return 1;
}
/* Security operations */
+/*
+ * Because so many of the cases are treated the same it
+ * cleans things up to use these macros instead of having
+ * duplicate text all over the place.
+ *
+ * call_void_hook:
+ * This is a hook that does not return a value.
+ *
+ * call_int_hook:
+ * This is hook that returns a value. Return the last
+ * non-zero return.
+ *
+ * call_int_must:
+ * Returns 1 if any LSMs actually had hooks and one
+ * or more got called. The return value goes into RC.
+ *
+ * call_int_cap_first:
+ * Like cap_int_hook, but call the cap_hook first and
+ * bail on fail.
+ *
+ * call_int_cap_last:
+ * Like cap_int_cap_first, but call the cap_hook last.
+ *
+ * call_alloc_hook:
+ * Allocate not only the LSM security blobs, but a blob
+ * to hold pointers to all of them as well.
+ *
+ */
+#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##FUNC], \
+ list[lsm_##FUNC]) \
+ sop->FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0) \
+
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, ...) ({ \
+ int rc = 0; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ int thisrc; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##FUNC], \
+ list[lsm_##FUNC]) { \
+ thisrc = sop->FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (thisrc) \
+ rc = thisrc; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ rc; \
+})
+
+#define call_int_must(RC, FUNC, ...) ({ \
+ int called = 0; \
+ RC = 0; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ int thisrc; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##FUNC], \
+ list[lsm_##FUNC]) { \
+ thisrc = sop->FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (thisrc) \
+ RC = thisrc; \
+ called = 1; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ called; \
+})
+
+#define call_int_cap_first(FUNC, ...) ({ \
+ int rc = 0; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ int thisrc; \
+ \
+ thisrc = cap_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (thisrc) { \
+ rc = thisrc; \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##FUNC], \
+ list[lsm_##FUNC]) { \
+ thisrc = sop->FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (thisrc) \
+ rc = thisrc; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ rc; \
+})
+
+#define call_int_cap_last(FUNC, ...) ({ \
+ int rc = 0; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ int thisrc; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(sop, &lsm_hooks[lsm_##FUNC], \
+ list[lsm_##FUNC]) { \
+ thisrc = sop->FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (thisrc) \
+ rc = thisrc; \
+ } \
+ \
+ if (!rc) \
+ rc = cap_##FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0); \
+ rc; \
+})
+
+
+#define call_alloc_hook(ALLOC, FREE, FIELD, GFP, ARG) ({ \
+ int rc = 0; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_operations *sop; \
+ struct security_operations *note[COMPOSER_MAX]; \
+ struct lsm_blob tblob; \
+ struct lsm_blob *bp = NULL; \
+ int successes = 0; \
+ \
+ memset(&tblob, 0, sizeof(tblob)); \
+ FIELD = &tblob; \
+ for_each_hook(sop, ALLOC) { \
+ rc = sop->ALLOC(ARG); \
+ if (rc) \
+ break; \
+ note[successes++] = sop; \
+ } \
+ if (tblob.lsm_setcount != 0) { \
+ if (rc == 0) \
+ bp = kmemdup(&tblob, sizeof(tblob), GFP); \
+ if (bp == NULL) { \
+ if (rc == 0) \
+ rc = -ENOMEM; \
+ while (successes > 0) \
+ note[--successes]->FREE(ARG); \
+ } \
+ } \
+ FIELD = bp; \
+ } while (0); \
+ rc; \
+})
+
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- int rc;
- rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+ return call_int_cap_first(ptrace_access_check, child, mode);
}
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- int rc;
- rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ return call_int_cap_first(ptrace_traceme, parent);
}
+/*
+ * Odd duck hook handling.
+ * This hook returns the set of capabilities available to
+ * the "target" task. Apparmor restricts the capabilities
+ * based on profile and SELinux may deny the ability to
+ * look and see what they are. cap_capget never fails.
+ */
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ kernel_cap_t cap[3];
+ kernel_cap_t this[3];
+ int rc;
+ int i;
+
+ rc = cap_capget(target, &cap[0], &cap[1], &cap[2]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, capget) {
+ rc = sop->capget(target, &this[0], &this[1], &this[2]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ cap[i] = cap_intersect(cap[i], this[i]);
+ }
+
+ *effective = cap[0];
+ *inheritable = cap[1];
+ *permitted = cap[2];
+
+ return 0;
}
int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -169,195 +702,214 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capset(new, old,
- effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return call_int_cap_first(capset, new, old, effective,
+ inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return call_int_cap_first(capable, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ return call_int_cap_first(capable, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
+ return call_int_hook(quotactl, cmds, type, id, sb);
}
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->quota_on(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(quota_on, dentry);
}
int security_syslog(int type)
{
- return security_ops->syslog(type);
+ return call_int_hook(syslog, type);
}
int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
- return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
+ return call_int_cap_first(settime, ts, tz);
}
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
- return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+ return call_int_cap_first(vm_enough_memory, mm, pages);
}
int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ return call_int_cap_first(bprm_set_creds, bprm);
}
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, bprm);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
}
+
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
}
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
}
int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+ return call_int_cap_last(bprm_secureexec, bprm);
}
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->sb_alloc_security(sb);
+ return call_alloc_hook(sb_alloc_security, sb_free_security,
+ sb->s_security, GFP_KERNEL, sb);
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
- security_ops->sb_free_security(sb);
+ call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
}
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
{
- return security_ops->sb_copy_data(orig, copy);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_copy_data, orig, copy);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_remount, sb, data);
}
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, sb, flags, data);
}
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, m, sb);
}
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, dentry);
}
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_mount, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
- return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_umount, mnt, flags);
}
int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
- return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, old_path, new_path);
}
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
- return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, sb_set_mnt_opts, sb, opts))
+ return rc;
+
+ if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
struct super_block *newsb)
{
- security_ops->sb_clone_mnt_opts(oldsb, newsb);
+ call_void_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, oldsb, newsb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
- return security_ops->sb_parse_opts_str(options, opts);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_parse_opts_str, options, opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = NULL;
- return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+ return call_alloc_hook(inode_alloc_security, inode_free_security,
+ inode->i_security, GFP_KERNEL, inode);
}
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
integrity_inode_free(inode);
- security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+
+ kfree(inode->i_security);
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
}
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{
+ int rc;
struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
- int ret;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof new_xattrs);
if (!initxattrs)
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, inode, dir, qstr,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
- ret = security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
- &lsm_xattr->name,
- &lsm_xattr->value,
- &lsm_xattr->value_len);
- if (ret)
+
+ if (!call_int_must(rc, inode_init_security, inode, dir, qstr,
+ &lsm_xattr->name, &lsm_xattr->value,
+ &lsm_xattr->value_len))
+ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (rc)
goto out;
evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
- if (ret)
+ rc = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ if (rc)
goto out;
- ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+ rc = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
out:
for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {
kfree(xattr->name);
kfree(xattr->value);
}
- return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
+ return (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
@@ -367,8 +919,9 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
- len);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, inode, dir, qstr, name,
+ value, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
@@ -378,7 +931,8 @@ int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
@@ -386,7 +940,8 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
@@ -394,14 +949,16 @@ int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, dir, dentry);
}
int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_unlink, dir, dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
@@ -410,7 +967,8 @@ int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -418,7 +976,8 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_link, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
}
int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
@@ -427,8 +986,9 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
(new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
- new_dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
@@ -436,26 +996,29 @@ int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_truncate(path);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_truncate, path);
}
int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_chmod, path, mode);
}
int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_chown, path, uid, gid);
}
int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
{
- return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
+ return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
}
#endif
@@ -463,7 +1026,8 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_create, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
@@ -472,14 +1036,16 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_link, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
}
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, dir, dentry);
}
int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -487,14 +1053,16 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
@@ -502,14 +1070,16 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, dir, dentry);
}
int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
@@ -518,40 +1088,45 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
(new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
- new_dir, new_dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rename, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
}
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, dentry);
}
int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, dentry, nd);
}
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_permission, inode, mask);
}
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, dentry, attr);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
@@ -560,22 +1135,25 @@ int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, mnt, dentry);
}
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
}
@@ -584,7 +1162,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return;
- security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
}
@@ -592,91 +1172,145 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, dentry, name);
}
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry);
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, dentry);
}
int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+
+ if (!call_int_must(rc, inode_removexattr, dentry, name))
+ rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+ return call_int_cap_first(inode_need_killpriv, dentry);
}
int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
+ return call_int_cap_first(inode_killpriv, dentry);
}
int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
{
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ int rc;
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+
+ /*
+ * Only one LSM will supply a given "name".
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP is an indication that the LSM does not
+ * provide a value for the provided name.
+ */
+ for_each_hook(sop, inode_getsecurity) {
+ rc = sop->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+ if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ int rc;
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Only one LSM will set a given "name".
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP is an indication that the LSM does not
+ * set a value for the provided name.
+ */
+ for_each_hook(sop, inode_setsecurity) {
+ rc = sop->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int thisrc;
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+
+ /*
+ * inode_listsecurity hooks never return negative values.
+ */
+ for_each_hook(sop, inode_listsecurity) {
+ thisrc = sop->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+ buffer += thisrc;
+ buffer_size -= thisrc;
+ rc += thisrc;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
}
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
- ret = security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ rc = call_int_hook(file_permission, file, mask);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
}
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file);
+ return call_alloc_hook(file_alloc_security, file_free_security,
+ file->f_security, GFP_KERNEL, file);
}
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{
- security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+ call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+ kfree(file->f_security);
+ file->f_security = NULL;
}
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+ return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, file, cmd, arg);
}
static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
@@ -716,370 +1350,528 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
- int ret;
- ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
- mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(mmap_file, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+ flags);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
}
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+ return call_int_cap_last(mmap_addr, addr);
}
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
- return security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, vma, reqprot, prot);
}
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->file_lock(file, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(file_lock, file, cmd);
}
int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- return security_ops->file_fcntl(file, cmd, arg);
+ return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, file, cmd, arg);
}
int security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->file_set_fowner(file);
+ return call_int_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
}
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
{
- return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(tsk, fown, sig);
+ return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, tsk, fown, sig);
}
int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->file_receive(file);
+ return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
}
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
- ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ rc = call_int_hook(file_open, file, cred);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+ return call_int_hook(task_create, clone_flags);
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- yama_task_free(task);
-#endif
- security_ops->task_free(task);
+ call_void_hook(task_free, task);
}
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ struct security_operations *note[COMPOSER_MAX];
+ struct lsm_blob tblob;
+ struct lsm_blob *bp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int successes = 0;
+
+ memset(&tblob, 0, sizeof(tblob));
+ cred->security = &tblob;
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, cred_alloc_blank) {
+ rc = sop->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ note[successes++] = sop;
+ }
+
+ if (tblob.lsm_setcount != 0) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ bp = kmemdup(&tblob, sizeof(tblob), gfp);
+ if (bp == NULL) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ while (successes > 0)
+ note[--successes]->cred_free(cred);
+ }
+ }
+ cred->security = bp;
+ return rc;
}
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- security_ops->cred_free(cred);
+ call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ kfree(cred->security);
+ cred->security = NULL;
}
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ struct security_operations *note[COMPOSER_MAX];
+ struct lsm_blob tblob;
+ struct lsm_blob *bp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int successes = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * new->security will be NULL on entry.
+ */
+ memset(&tblob, 0, sizeof(tblob));
+ new->security = &tblob;
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, cred_prepare) {
+ rc = sop->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ note[successes++] = sop;
+ }
+
+ if (tblob.lsm_setcount != 0) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ bp = kmemdup(&tblob, sizeof(tblob), gfp);
+ if (bp == NULL) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ while (successes > 0)
+ note[--successes]->cred_free(new);
+ }
+ }
+ new->security = bp;
+ return rc;
}
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+ call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, new, secid);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, new, inode);
}
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, kmod_name);
}
int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
{
- int ret;
+ int rc;
- ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ rc = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, file);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return ima_module_check(file);
}
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
+ return call_int_cap_first(task_fix_setuid, new, old, flags);
}
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, p, pgid);
}
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getpgid(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, p);
}
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getsid(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getsid, p);
}
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->task_getsecid(p, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ return call_int_cap_first(task_setnice, p, nice);
}
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return security_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ return call_int_cap_first(task_setioprio, p, ioprio);
}
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getioprio(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, p);
}
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, p, resource, new_rlim);
}
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p);
+ return call_int_cap_first(task_setscheduler, p);
}
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, p);
}
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_movememory(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_movememory, p);
}
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(task_kill, p, info, sig, secid);
}
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_wait(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_wait, p);
}
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ struct security_operations *sop;
int rc;
- rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+ rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
if (rc != -ENOSYS)
return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, task_prctl) {
+ rc = sop->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ /*
+ * -ENOSYS returned if the lsm doesn't handle that control.
+ * If the LSM does handle the control return the result.
+ * The assumption for the time being is that no two LSMs
+ * will handle a control.
+ */
+ if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -ENOSYS;
}
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
- security_ops->task_to_inode(p, inode);
+ call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
}
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
{
- return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
+ return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, ipcp, flag);
}
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+ return call_alloc_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, msg_msg_free_security,
+ msg->security, GFP_KERNEL, msg);
}
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+ call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+
+ kfree(msg->security);
+ msg->security = NULL;
}
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq);
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *kp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+ return call_alloc_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+ msg_queue_free_security, kp->security, GFP_KERNEL,
+ msq);
}
void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
- security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+ call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+
+ kfree(msq->q_perm.security);
+ msq->q_perm.security = NULL;
}
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_associate(msq, msqflg);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, msq, msqflg);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, msq, cmd);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq,
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msqflg);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, msq, msg, msqflg);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
}
int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
- return security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp);
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *kp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+ return call_alloc_hook(shm_alloc_security, shm_free_security,
+ kp->security, GFP_KERNEL, shp);
}
void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
- security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+ call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+
+ kfree(shp->shm_perm.security);
+ shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
}
int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
- return security_ops->shm_associate(shp, shmflg);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_associate, shp, shmflg);
}
int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, shp, cmd);
}
int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
- return security_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
}
int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma)
{
- return security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma);
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *kp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+ return call_alloc_hook(sem_alloc_security, sem_free_security,
+ kp->security, GFP_KERNEL, sma);
}
void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma)
{
- security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+ call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+
+ kfree(sma->sem_perm.security);
+ sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
}
int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
- return security_ops->sem_associate(sma, semflg);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_associate, sma, semflg);
}
int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, sma, cmd);
}
int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter)
{
- return security_ops->sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semop, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
}
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return;
- security_ops->d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+
+ call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
- return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ char *lsm;
+ int lsmlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Names will either be in the legacy form containing
+ * no periods (".") or they will be the LSM name followed
+ * by the legacy suffix.
+ * "current" or "selinux.current"
+ *
+ * Legacy names are handled by the presenting LSM.
+ * Suffixed names are handled by the named LSM.
+ */
+ if (lsm_present && !strchr(name, '.'))
+ return present_getprocattr(p, name, value);
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, getprocattr) {
+ lsm = sop->name;
+ lsmlen = strlen(lsm);
+ if (!strncmp(name, lsm, lsmlen) && name[lsmlen] == '.')
+ return sop->getprocattr(p, name + lsmlen + 1, value);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
- return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ char *lsm;
+ int lsmlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Names will either be in the legacy form containing
+ * no periods (".") or they will be the LSM name followed
+ * by the legacy suffix.
+ * "current" or "selinux.current"
+ *
+ * Legacy names are handled by the presenting LSM.
+ * Suffixed names are handled by the named LSM.
+ */
+ if (lsm_present && !strchr(name, '.'))
+ return present_setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, setprocattr) {
+ lsm = sop->name;
+ lsmlen = strlen(lsm);
+ if (!strncmp(name, lsm, lsmlen) && name[lsmlen] == '.')
+ return sop->setprocattr(p, name + lsmlen + 1, value,
+ size);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ return call_int_cap_first(netlink_send, sk, skb);
}
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, secid_to_secctx, secid, secdata, seclen))
+ return rc;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid))
+ return rc;
+ *secid = 0;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
@@ -1087,188 +1879,228 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
- return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+ return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, sock, other, newsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- return security_ops->unix_may_send(sock, other);
+ return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- return security_ops->socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_create, family, type, protocol, kern);
}
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- return security_ops->socket_post_create(sock, family, type,
- protocol, kern);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, sock, family, type,
+ protocol, kern);
}
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- return security_ops->socket_bind(sock, address, addrlen);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_bind, sock, address, addrlen);
}
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- return security_ops->socket_connect(sock, address, addrlen);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_connect, sock, address, addrlen);
}
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
- return security_ops->socket_listen(sock, backlog);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_listen, sock, backlog);
}
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_accept, sock, newsock);
}
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
- return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, sock, msg, size);
}
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags)
{
- return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, sock, msg, size, flags);
}
int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, sock);
}
int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeername(sock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, sock);
}
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, sock, level, optname);
}
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
- return security_ops->socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, sock, level, optname);
}
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
- return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, sock, how);
}
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, sk, skb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval,
+ optlen, len))
+ return rc;
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid))
+ return rc;
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return security_ops->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ struct security_operations *note[COMPOSER_MAX];
+ struct lsm_blob tblob;
+ struct lsm_blob *bp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int successes = 0;
+
+ memset(&tblob, 0, sizeof(tblob));
+ sk->sk_security = &tblob;
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, sk_alloc_security) {
+ rc = sop->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ note[successes++] = sop;
+ }
+
+ if (tblob.lsm_setcount != 0) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ bp = kmemdup(&tblob, sizeof(tblob), priority);
+ if (bp == NULL) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ while (successes > 0)
+ note[--successes]->sk_free_security(sk);
+ }
+ }
+ sk->sk_security = bp;
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
- security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
+ call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+ call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
{
- security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
+ call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl)
{
- security_ops->req_classify_flow(req, fl);
+ call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, fl);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
+ call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
{
- return security_ops->inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
+ return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, sk, skb, req);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- security_ops->inet_csk_clone(newsk, req);
+ call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
}
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
+ call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
}
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
{
- security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc();
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
{
- security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec();
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+ call_void_hook(tun_dev_post_create, sk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, sk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
@@ -1276,78 +2108,94 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+/*
+ * The xfrm hooks present special issues for composition
+ * as they don't use the usual scheme for passing in blobs.
+ * LSM registration checks ensure that only one xfrm using
+ * security module is loaded at a time.
+ * This shouldn't be much of an issue since SELinux is the
+ * only security module ever expected to use xfrm.
+ */
int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, ctxp, sec_ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
}
void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(ctx);
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, ctx);
}
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, 0);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_security, x, sec_ctx, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
{
- if (!polsec)
- return 0;
/*
* We want the context to be taken from secid which is usually
* from the sock.
*/
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, secid);
+
+ if (!polsec)
+ return 0;
+
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_security, x, NULL, secid);
}
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_delete_security(x);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, x);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
}
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
const struct flowi *fl)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, x, xp, fl))
+ return rc;
+ return 1;
}
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, secid, 1);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, secid, 1);
}
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
- int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
BUG_ON(rc);
}
@@ -1360,23 +2208,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
+ struct security_operations *sop;
+ struct security_operations *note[COMPOSER_MAX];
+ struct lsm_blob tblob;
+ struct lsm_blob *bp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int successes = 0;
+
+ memset(&tblob, 0, sizeof(tblob));
+ key->security = &tblob;
+
+ for_each_hook(sop, key_alloc) {
+ rc = sop->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ note[successes++] = sop;
+ }
+
+ if (tblob.lsm_setcount != 0) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ bp = kmemdup(&tblob, sizeof(tblob), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (bp == NULL) {
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ while (successes > 0)
+ note[--successes]->key_free(key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ key->security = bp;
+ return rc;
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
- security_ops->key_free(key);
+ call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+
+ kfree(key->security);
+ key->security = NULL;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
- return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+ return call_int_hook(key_permission, key_ref, cred, perm);
}
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (call_int_must(rc, key_getsecurity, key, _buffer))
+ return rc;
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -1385,23 +2270,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, krule);
}
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
- security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+ actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
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