linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig

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Date:	Wed, 13 Feb 2013 12:51:15 -0500
From:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To:	"Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Cc:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] ima: Support appraise_type=imasig_optional

On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 07:33:13PM +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2013-02-13 at 15:13 +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
> >> On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 2:56 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, 2013-02-13 at 14:31 +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 at 10:11 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> > @@ -158,7 +165,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> >> >> >         }
> >> >> >         switch (xattr_value->type) {
> >> >> >         case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
> >> >> > -               if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
> >> >> > +               if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ||
> >> >> > +                   iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL) {
> >> >> >                         cause = "IMA signature required";
> >> >> >                         status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
> >> >> >                         break;
> >> >>
> >> >> This looks a bit odd... If "optional" signature is missing  - we fail..
> >> >> It is optional... Why we should fail?
> >> >
> >> > 'imasig_optional' does not only mean that the signature is optional, but
> >> > also implies that it has to be a digital signature, not a hash.  This
> >> > latter part is what IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED means.
> >> >
> >> > If 'imasig_optional' set both 'IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL' and
> >> > 'IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED', then this change wouldn't be necessary.
> >> >
> >> > IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED would enforce that it is a signature.
> >> > IMA_DIGSIG_OPTIONAL would fail only for files with invalid signatures.
> >> >
> >>
> >> It sounds odd that optional signature is actually required.
> >> Optional for me means that it may be there or may be not.
> >> If it is not there, then it may be hash or nothing.
> >>
> >> I see it is more logical if it is "appraise_type=optional",
> >> which means that we might have no xattr value, hash or signature.
> >> It if happens to be a signature, then IMA_DIGSIG flag will be set.
> >
> > Right, 'appraise_type=' could have been defined either as a comma
> > separated list of options (eg. appraise_type=imassig,optional) or, as
> > Vivek implemented, a new option.  Eventually, we will need to extend
> > 'appraise_type=' (eg. required algorithm), but for now I don't have a
> > problem with the new option.
> >
> 
> It is not exactly what I meant. IOW, I do not want
> appraise_type=imasig,optional.
> 
> Optional for me is that xattr value is optional. It might be nothing,
> hash or imasig...
> 
> If it would happen that it contains signature, then IMA_DIGSIG flag
> would be set,
> and process could get needed capability as Vivek wants.

Hi Dmitry,

While we are at it, I thought I will mention what else is going in my
mind w.r.t next step.

I looked at your patch. That patch looks at IMG_DIGSIG
flag and sets bprm->unsafe with appropriate flag. It works well if 
signature verification before loading executable alone is sufficient.

But this leaves a small window open where somebody could write to the
disk block directly (bypass filesystem) after IMA signature verification.
Then modified image will be loaded by the binary handler.

To avoid that, I think I will need to do appraisal after loading the file
(with VM_LOCKED flag).

I guess I will need to introduce another hook say bprm_post_load() to
verify integrity of file.

So this raises few questions.

- Are two appraisals really necessary. From my use case perspective
  initially I just need to know whether digital signature are present
  or not and appraisal of file is not required. I guess it is one
  optimization area to keep appraisal overhead minimum in exec() path.

- When I go for second appraisal after loading file, current IMA code
  will have success result in iint->flags. I need to figure a way out
  to reset cache result and force reappraisal.

Thanks
Vivek
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