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Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 02:46:58 +0000 From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com> To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> CC: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot On Wed, 2013-02-13 at 17:08 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > Well, for at least things with device nodes (/dev/mem, /dev/msr and so > on) it should be possible, no? ioperm() and iopl() are another matter. Sure, if we can guarantee that a signed userspace loads a signed SELinux policy before any unsigned code runs. But, realistically, that's not going to be possible. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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