linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 2/2] initramfs with digital signature protection

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Date:	Thu, 11 Apr 2013 21:42:54 +0300
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 2/2] initramfs with digital signature protection

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 5:55 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 11:06:55AM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> I respond to the original question of this thread.
>> signed initramfs allows not only to add keys to the keyrings but perform
>> other initialization,
>> which requires user-space.
>> Keys can be embedded into the kernel. This is fine.
>
> What other initialization user space need to do where we can't trust
> root (even in secureboot mode).
>
> IOW, if keys can be embedded in kernel (or read from UEFI db and MOK db),
> what other operation requires initramfs to be signed. It could very well
> be unsigned initramfs like today.
>

It looks like you do not hear me.
I said that any user space initialization can be done from signed user space.
For example IMA policy can be initialized.

I see that you see your particular case and in that case you do not
require that.
That is fine. That is your case....

 - Dmitry

> Thanks
> Vivek
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