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Date:	Tue, 06 Aug 2013 15:25:44 -0700
From:	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC:	LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 0/6] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs

On 8/5/2013 11:30 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2013 at 11:52 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> The /proc/*/attr interfaces are given to one LSM. This can be
>> done by setting CONFIG_SECURITY_PRESENT. Additional interfaces
>> have been created in /proc/*/attr so that each LSM has its own
>> named interfaces. The name of the presenting LSM can be read from
> For me, this is one problem that was bothering me, but it was a cosmetic
> one that I'd mentioned before: I really disliked the /proc/$pid/attr
> interface being named "$lsm.$file". I feel it's important to build
> directories in attr/ for each LSM. So, I spent time to figure out a way to
> do this. This patch changes the interface to /proc/$pid/attr/$lsm/$file
> instead, which I feel has a much more appealing organizational structure.

I will confess that the reason I went with <lsm>.current instead of
<lsm>/current was that the former was easier to implement.

> -Kees
>
> ---
> Subject: [PATCH] LSM: use subdirectories for LSM attr files
>
> Instead of filling the /proc/$pid/attr/ directory with every LSM's needed
> attr files, insert a directory entry for each LSM which contains the
> needed files.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c           |   95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  fs/proc/internal.h       |    1 +
>  include/linux/security.h |   11 +++---
>  security/security.c      |   67 ++++++++++++++------------------
>  4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 941fe83..4c80ffd 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ struct pid_entry {
>  	NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)),			\
>  		NULL, &proc_single_file_operations,	\
>  		{ .proc_show = show } )
> +#define ATTR(LSM, NAME, MODE)				\
> +	NOD(NAME, (S_IFREG|(MODE)),			\
> +		NULL, &proc_pid_attr_operations,	\
> +		{ .lsm = LSM } )
>  
>  /*
>   * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
> @@ -2292,7 +2296,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
>  	if (!task)
>  		return -ESRCH;
>  
> -	length = security_getprocattr(task,
> +	length = security_getprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
>  				      (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
>  				      &p);
>  	put_task_struct(task);
> @@ -2335,7 +2339,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
>  	if (length < 0)
>  		goto out_free;
>  
> -	length = security_setprocattr(task,
> +	length = security_setprocattr(task, PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
>  				      (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
>  				      (void*)page, count);
>  	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> @@ -2353,29 +2357,82 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {
>  	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
>  };
>  
> +#define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \
> +static int proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_readdir(struct file * filp, \
> +			     void * dirent, filldir_t filldir) \
> +{ \
> +	return proc_pident_readdir(filp, dirent, filldir, \
> +				   LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
> +				   ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
> +} \
> +\
> +static const struct file_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_ops = { \
> +	.read		= generic_read_dir, \
> +	.readdir	= proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_readdir, \
> +	.llseek		= default_llseek, \
> +}; \
> +\
> +static struct dentry *proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir, \
> +				struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) \
> +{ \
> +	return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry, \
> +				  LSM##_attr_dir_stuff, \
> +				  ARRAY_SIZE(LSM##_attr_dir_stuff)); \
> +} \
> +\
> +static const struct inode_operations proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_inode_ops = { \
> +	.lookup		= proc_##LSM##_attr_dir_lookup, \
> +	.getattr	= pid_getattr, \
> +	.setattr	= proc_setattr, \
> +};

That's one hell of a macro you got there, Kees.
I'm not saying it's bad, but it is quite the mouthful.

> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> +static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> +	ATTR("selinux", "current",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR("selinux", "prev",		S_IRUGO),
> +	ATTR("selinux", "exec",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR("selinux", "fscreate",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR("selinux", "keycreate",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +};
> +LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux);
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> +static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> +	ATTR("smack", "current",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +};
> +LSM_DIR_OPS(smack);
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> +static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> +	ATTR("apparmor", "current",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR("apparmor", "prev",	S_IRUGO),
> +	ATTR("apparmor", "exec",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +};
> +LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor);
> +#endif
> +

%s/dir_stuff/dir_entries/g
It doesn't have to be "entries", but "stuff" is horribly non-descriptive.


>  static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
> -	REG("current",            S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("prev",               S_IRUGO,	   proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("exec",               S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("fscreate",           S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("keycreate",          S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("sockcreate",         S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("context",            S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "current",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "prev",		S_IRUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "exec",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "fscreate",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
> +	ATTR(NULL, "context",		S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> -	REG("selinux.current",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("selinux.prev",       S_IRUGO,         proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("selinux.exec",       S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("selinux.fscreate",   S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("selinux.keycreate",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("selinux.sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> +	DIR("selinux",			S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
> +	    proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
> -	REG("smack.current",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> +	DIR("smack",			S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
> +	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> -	REG("apparmor.current",   S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("apparmor.prev",      S_IRUGO,         proc_pid_attr_operations),
> -	REG("apparmor.exec",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO, proc_pid_attr_operations),
> +	DIR("apparmor",			S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO,
> +	    proc_apparmor_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_apparmor_attr_dir_ops),
>  #endif
>  
>  };
> diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
> index d600fb0..795f649 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/internal.h
> +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
> @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ union proc_op {
>  	int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m,
>  		struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid,
>  		struct task_struct *task);
> +	const char *lsm;
>  };
>  
>  struct proc_inode {
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d60e21c..fa89618 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -2115,9 +2115,10 @@ int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
>  int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
>  			unsigned nsops, int alter);
>  void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
> -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
> -int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
> -			 size_t size);
> +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> +                         char **value);
> +int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> +                         void *value, size_t size);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen,
>  			     struct security_operations **secops);
> @@ -2801,8 +2802,8 @@ static inline void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
>  					  struct inode *inode)
>  { }
>  
> -static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
> -				       char **value)
> +static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *lsm,
> +                       char *name, char **value)
>  {
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 119a377..499af30 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1897,74 +1897,65 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
>  
> -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
> +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> +			 char **value)
>  {
>  	struct security_operations *sop = NULL;
>  	struct secids secid;
> -	char *lsm;
> -	int lsmlen;
>  	int ret;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * Names will either be in the legacy form containing
> -	 * no periods (".") or they will be the LSM name followed
> -	 * by the legacy suffix. "current" or "selinux.current"
> -	 * The exception is "context", which gets all of the LSMs.
> -	 *
> -	 * Legacy names are handled by the presenting LSM.
> -	 * Suffixed names are handled by the named LSM.
> +	 * Target LSM will be either NULL or looked up by name. Names with
> +	 * a NULL LSM (legacy) are handled by the presenting LSM. The
> +	 * exception is "context", which gets all of the LSMs.
>  	 */
>  	if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) {
> +		char *lsmname;
> +		int lsmlen;
> +
>  		security_task_getsecid(p, &secid);
> -		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &lsm, &lsmlen, &sop);
> +		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&secid, &lsmname, &lsmlen, &sop);
>  		if (ret == 0) {
> -			*value = kstrdup(lsm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +			*value = kstrdup(lsmname, GFP_KERNEL);
>  			if (*value == NULL)
>  				ret = -ENOMEM;
>  			else
>  				ret = strlen(*value);
> -			security_release_secctx(lsm, lsmlen, sop);
> +			security_release_secctx(lsmname, lsmlen, sop);
>  		}
>  		return ret;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (present_ops && !strchr(name, '.'))
> -		return present_getprocattr(p, name, value);
> -
> -	for_each_hook(sop, getprocattr) {
> -		lsm = sop->name;
> -		lsmlen = strlen(lsm);
> -		if (!strncmp(name, lsm, lsmlen) && name[lsmlen] == '.')
> -			return sop->getprocattr(p, name + lsmlen + 1, value);
> +	if (!lsm) {
> +		if (present_ops)
> +			return present_getprocattr(p, name, value);
> +	} else {
> +		for_each_hook(sop, getprocattr) {
> +			if (!strcmp(lsm, sop->name))
> +				return sop->getprocattr(p, name, value);
> +		}
>  	}
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
>  
> -int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
> -			 size_t size)
> +int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> +			 void *value, size_t size)
>  {
>  	struct security_operations *sop;
> -	char *lsm;
> -	int lsmlen;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * Names will either be in the legacy form containing
> -	 * no periods (".") or they will be the LSM name followed
> -	 * by the legacy suffix.
> -	 * "current" or "selinux.current"
> -	 *
> -	 * Legacy names are handled by the presenting LSM.
> -	 * Suffixed names are handled by the named LSM.
> +	 * Target LSM will be either NULL or looked up by name. Names with
> +	 * a NULL LSM (legacy) are handled by the presenting LSM. The
>  	 */
>  	if (present_ops && !strchr(name, '.'))
>  		return present_setprocattr(p, name, value, size);

We'll want to loose the preceding two lines, and add some later.


> -	for_each_hook(sop, setprocattr) {
> -		lsm = sop->name;
> -		lsmlen = strlen(lsm);
> -		if (!strncmp(name, lsm, lsmlen) && name[lsmlen] == '.')
> -			return sop->setprocattr(p, name + lsmlen + 1, value,
> -						size);
> +	if (lsm) {
> +		for_each_hook(sop, setprocattr) {
> +			if (!strcmp(lsm, sop->name))
> +				return sop->setprocattr(p, name, value,
> +							size);
> +		}
> -	}

  +	} else if (present_ops)
  +		return present_setprocattr(p, name, value, size);

>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }

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