[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 17:24:16 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu" <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown
On Mon, 2013-09-09 at 13:18 -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
> You may as well bite the bullet on this one, and tie it together. Without
> Secure Boot, by the time your code runs it's already too late. That's the
> whole point of Secure Boot, after all.
It's already been made clear that nobody's interested in merging a
solution that's specific to Secure Boot. I can add a command line option
to set a default, and then anyone using an attesting bootloader
(TPM/TXT) can verify the state.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists