Date:	Sun, 15 Sep 2013 08:56:55 +0800
From:	"Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
	opensuse-kernel@...nsuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@...e.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
	James Bottomley <james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, JKosina@...e.com,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Gary Lin <GLin@...e.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>
Subject: [PATCH V4 09/15] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot

This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.

v3:
- Change the naming of SIG_LENG to SIG_LEN
- Extracts the code of signature generation code from copy_data_pages() to
  swsusp_generate_signature(), call it in swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages()
  finished.
- Change the naming of h_buf to handle_buffers.
- Removed duplicate code in snapshot_verify_signature() and
  snapshot_image_verify().
- Merged [PATCH 14/18]
  Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check

v2:
- Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
  boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
  snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
  When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
  space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
  forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
  key to any other storage, e.g. swap.

Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@...e.com>
---
 kernel/power/power.h    |   13 ++
 kernel/power/snapshot.c |  288 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/power/swap.c     |    4 +
 kernel/power/user.c     |    5 +
 4 files changed, 307 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 661f124..d2da75b 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 
+/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
+#define SIG_LEN 512
+
 struct swsusp_info {
 	struct new_utsname	uts;
 	u32			version_code;
@@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
 	unsigned long		image_pages;
 	unsigned long		pages;
 	unsigned long		size;
+	unsigned long           sig_forward_info_pfn;
+	u8			signature[SIG_LEN];
 } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
@@ -134,6 +139,14 @@ extern int snapshot_read_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern void snapshot_write_finalize(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
 extern int snapshot_image_loaded(struct snapshot_handle *handle);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+extern int snapshot_image_verify(void);
+#else
+static inline int snapshot_image_verify(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
 
 /* If unset, the snapshot device cannot be open. */
 extern atomic_t snapshot_device_available;
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index 349587b..edab31f 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -1031,6 +1034,126 @@ static inline void copy_data_page(unsigned long dst_pfn, unsigned long src_pfn)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+#define SNAPSHOT_HASH "sha256"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Signature of snapshot for check.
+ */
+static u8 signature[SIG_LEN];
+
+/*
+ * Keep the pfn of forward information buffer from resume target. We write
+ * the next time sign key to this page in snapshot image before restore.
+ */
+unsigned long sig_forward_info_pfn;
+
+void **handle_buffers;
+void *sig_forward_info_buf;
+
+static int
+swsusp_generate_signature(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, unsigned int nr_pages)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+	unsigned long pfn;
+	struct page *d_page;
+	void *hash_buffer = NULL;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	u8 *digest;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	struct key *s4_sign_key;
+	struct public_key_signature *pks;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		pr_err("digest allocate fail");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_digest;
+	}
+	desc = (void *) digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	memory_bm_position_reset(copy_bm);
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+		pfn = memory_bm_next_pfn(copy_bm);
+
+		/* Generate digest */
+		d_page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+		if (PageHighMem(d_page)) {
+			void *kaddr;
+			kaddr = kmap_atomic(d_page);
+			copy_page(buffer, kaddr);
+			kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
+			hash_buffer = buffer;
+		} else {
+			hash_buffer = page_address(d_page);
+		}
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, hash_buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_shash;
+	}
+
+	crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	/* Generate signature by private key */
+	s4_sign_key = get_sign_key();
+	if (!s4_sign_key || IS_ERR(s4_sign_key)) {
+		pr_err("Get S4 sign key fail: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(s4_sign_key));
+		ret = PTR_ERR(s4_sign_key);
+		goto error_key;
+	}
+
+	pks = generate_signature(s4_sign_key, digest, PKEY_HASH_SHA256, false);
+	if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
+		pr_err("Generate signature fail: %lx", PTR_ERR(pks));
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
+		goto error_sign;
+	} else
+		memcpy(signature, pks->S, pks->k);
+
+	destroy_sign_key(s4_sign_key);
+
+	if (pks && pks->digest)
+		kfree(pks->digest);
+	if (pks && pks->rsa.s)
+		mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
+	kfree(pks);
+	kfree(digest);
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	return 0;
+
+error_sign:
+	destroy_sign_key(s4_sign_key);
+error_key:
+error_shash:
+	kfree(digest);
+error_digest:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return ret;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */
+}
+
 static void
 copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
 {
@@ -1580,6 +1703,7 @@ swsusp_alloc(struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm, struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm,
 asmlinkage int swsusp_save(void)
 {
 	unsigned int nr_pages, nr_highmem;
+	int ret;
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "PM: Creating hibernation image:\n");
 
@@ -1614,6 +1738,14 @@ asmlinkage int swsusp_save(void)
 	nr_copy_pages = nr_pages;
 	nr_meta_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(nr_pages * sizeof(long), PAGE_SIZE);
 
+	if (skey_data_available()) {
+		ret = swsusp_generate_signature(&copy_bm, nr_pages);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	} else
+		/* set zero signature if skey doesn't exist */
+		memset(signature, 0, SIG_LEN);
+
 	printk(KERN_INFO "PM: Hibernation image created (%d pages copied)\n",
 		nr_pages);
 
@@ -1657,6 +1789,8 @@ static int init_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	info->pages = snapshot_get_image_size();
 	info->size = info->pages;
 	info->size <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+	info->sig_forward_info_pfn = get_sig_forward_info_pfn();
+	memcpy(info->signature, signature, SIG_LEN);
 	return init_header_complete(info);
 }
 
@@ -1819,6 +1953,8 @@ load_header(struct swsusp_info *info)
 	if (!error) {
 		nr_copy_pages = info->image_pages;
 		nr_meta_pages = info->pages - info->image_pages - 1;
+		sig_forward_info_pfn = info->sig_forward_info_pfn;
+		memcpy(signature, info->signature, SIG_LEN);
 	}
 	return error;
 }
@@ -2159,7 +2295,8 @@ prepare_image(struct memory_bitmap *new_bm, struct memory_bitmap *bm)
  *	set for its caller to write to.
  */
 
-static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
+static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca,
+		unsigned long *_pfn)
 {
 	struct pbe *pbe;
 	struct page *page;
@@ -2168,6 +2305,9 @@ static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
 	if (pfn == BM_END_OF_MAP)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 
+	if (_pfn)
+		*_pfn = pfn;
+
 	page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
 	if (PageHighMem(page))
 		return get_highmem_page_buffer(page, ca);
@@ -2214,6 +2354,7 @@ static void *get_buffer(struct memory_bitmap *bm, struct chain_allocator *ca)
 int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 {
 	static struct chain_allocator ca;
+	unsigned long pfn;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	/* Check if we have already loaded the entire image */
@@ -2236,6 +2377,15 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+		/* Allocate void * array to keep buffer point for generate hash,
+		 * handle_buffers will freed in snapshot_image_verify().
+		 */
+		handle_buffers = kmalloc(sizeof(void *) * nr_copy_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!handle_buffers)
+			pr_err("Allocate hash buffer fail!\n");
+#endif
+
 		error = memory_bm_create(&copy_bm, GFP_ATOMIC, PG_ANY);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
@@ -2258,20 +2408,31 @@ int snapshot_write_next(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 			chain_init(&ca, GFP_ATOMIC, PG_SAFE);
 			memory_bm_position_reset(&orig_bm);
 			restore_pblist = NULL;
-			handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca);
+			handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca, &pfn);
 			handle->sync_read = 0;
 			if (IS_ERR(handle->buffer))
 				return PTR_ERR(handle->buffer);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+			if (handle_buffers)
+				*handle_buffers = handle->buffer;
+#endif
 		}
 	} else {
 		copy_last_highmem_page();
 		/* Restore page key for data page (s390 only). */
 		page_key_write(handle->buffer);
-		handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca);
+		handle->buffer = get_buffer(&orig_bm, &ca, &pfn);
 		if (IS_ERR(handle->buffer))
 			return PTR_ERR(handle->buffer);
 		if (handle->buffer != buffer)
 			handle->sync_read = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+		if (handle_buffers)
+			*(handle_buffers + (handle->cur - nr_meta_pages - 1)) = handle->buffer;
+		/* Keep the buffer of sign key in snapshot */
+		if (pfn == sig_forward_info_pfn)
+			sig_forward_info_buf = handle->buffer;
+#endif
 	}
 	handle->cur++;
 	return PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -2304,6 +2465,127 @@ int snapshot_image_loaded(struct snapshot_handle *handle)
 			handle->cur <= nr_meta_pages + nr_copy_pages);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+int snapshot_verify_signature(u8 *digest, size_t digest_size)
+{
+	struct key *s4_wake_key;
+	struct public_key_signature *pks;
+	int ret;
+	MPI mpi;
+
+	/* load public key */
+	s4_wake_key = get_wake_key();
+	if (!s4_wake_key || IS_ERR(s4_wake_key)) {
+		pr_err("PM: Get S4 wake key fail: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(s4_wake_key));
+		return PTR_ERR(s4_wake_key);
+	}
+
+	pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pks) {
+		pr_err("PM: Allocate public key signature fail!");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	pks->pkey_hash_algo = PKEY_HASH_SHA256;
+	pks->digest = digest;
+	pks->digest_size = digest_size;
+
+	mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(signature, get_key_length(s4_wake_key));
+	if (!mpi) {
+		pr_err("PM: mpi_read_raw_data fail!\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_mpi;
+	}
+	pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
+	pks->nr_mpi = 1;
+
+	/* RSA signature check */
+	ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
+
+	if (pks->rsa.s)
+		mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
+error_mpi:
+	kfree(pks);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(int sig_check_ret)
+{
+	if (!sig_forward_info_buf)
+		return;
+
+	/* Fill new s4 sign key to snapshot in memory */
+	fill_sig_forward_info(sig_forward_info_buf, sig_check_ret);
+	/* clean skey page data */
+	erase_skey_data();
+}
+
+int snapshot_image_verify(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	u8 *digest = NULL;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	if (!handle_buffers)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = wkey_data_available();
+	if (ret)
+		goto forward_ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		pr_err("digest allocate fail");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_digest;
+	}
+	desc = (void *) digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_copy_pages; i++) {
+		ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, *(handle_buffers + i), PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto error_shash;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
+	if (ret)
+		pr_info("PM: snapshot signature check FAIL: %d\n", ret);
+	else
+		pr_info("PM: snapshot signature check SUCCESS!\n");
+
+forward_ret:
+	snapshot_fill_sig_forward_info(ret);
+error_shash:
+	kfree(handle_buffers);
+	kfree(digest);
+error_digest:
+	if (tfm)
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM
 /* Assumes that @buf is ready and points to a "safe" page */
 static inline void
diff --git a/kernel/power/swap.c b/kernel/power/swap.c
index 7c33ed2..5aef236 100644
--- a/kernel/power/swap.c
+++ b/kernel/power/swap.c
@@ -1004,6 +1004,8 @@ static int load_image(struct swap_map_handle *handle,
 		snapshot_write_finalize(snapshot);
 		if (!snapshot_image_loaded(snapshot))
 			ret = -ENODATA;
+		else
+			ret = snapshot_image_verify();
 	}
 	swsusp_show_speed(&start, &stop, nr_to_read, "Read");
 	return ret;
@@ -1358,6 +1360,8 @@ out_finish:
 				}
 			}
 		}
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = snapshot_image_verify();
 	}
 	swsusp_show_speed(&start, &stop, nr_to_read, "Read");
 out_clean:
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 4ed81e7..e2088af 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 		if (!data->frozen || data->ready)
 			break;
 		pm_restore_gfp_mask();
+		restore_sig_forward_info();
 		thaw_processes();
 		data->frozen = 0;
 		break;
@@ -253,6 +254,10 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
 			error = -EPERM;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (snapshot_image_verify()) {
+			error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		error = hibernation_restore(data->platform_support);
 		break;
 
-- 
1.6.0.2

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists