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Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 16:01:46 +0200
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
casey.schaufler@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/8] integrity: fix checkpatch errors
On Mon, Mar 3, 2014 at 3:41 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 16:59 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult to see new errors..
>> This patch fix them.
>
> A number of these errors are a result of inconsistencies between Lindent
> and checkpatch. This patch uses the checkpatch preferences.
>
>> Some lines with over 80 chars remained unchanged to improve
>> code readability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
>
> This patch doesn't apply cleanly to either linux-integrity/next-fixes or
> to linux-security/next.
>
> thanks,
>
Hi,
Did you apply Joe Perches's patch what you signed-off first?
- Dmitry
> Mimi
>
>> ---
>> security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 28 +++++++-------
>> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +-
>> security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++------------------
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 14 +++----
>> security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 4 +-
>> 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
>> index 30bd1ec..37c88dd 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
>> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
>> @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
>> /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
>> extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
>>
>> -extern int evm_init_key(void);
>> -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>> - const char *req_xattr_name,
>> - const char *req_xattr_value,
>> - size_t req_xattr_value_len);
>> -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
>> - const char *req_xattr_value,
>> - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
>> -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
>> - const char *req_xattr_value,
>> - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
>> -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
>> - char *hmac_val);
>> -extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
>> +int evm_init_key(void);
>> +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
>> + const char *req_xattr_name,
>> + const char *req_xattr_value,
>> + size_t req_xattr_value_len);
>> +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
>> + const char *req_xattr_value,
>> + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
>> +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
>> + const char *req_xattr_value,
>> + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
>> +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
>> + char *hmac_val);
>> +int evm_init_secfs(void);
>>
>> #endif
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
>> index 9bd329f..babd862 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
>> @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
>> umode_t mode;
>> } hmac_misc;
>>
>> - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
>> + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
>> hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
>> hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
>> hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
>> hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
>> hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
>> - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
>> + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
>> if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
>> crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
>> sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
>> index c49d3f1..a521edf 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
>> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
>> {
>> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
>>
>> - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
>> + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
>> iint->version = 0;
>> iint->flags = 0UL;
>> iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> index 393b9d4..c6b4a73 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out:
>> * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
>> *
>> * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
>> - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
>> + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
>> * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
>> - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
>> - * mask: contains the permission mask
>> + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
>> + * mask: contains the permission mask
>> * fsmagic: hex value
>> *
>> * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
>> @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>> *
>> * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
>> * but the measurement could already exist:
>> - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
>> + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
>> * different filesystems.
>> * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
>> * containing the hashing info.
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> index 9999057..d257e36 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
>> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
>> *
>> * File: ima_crypto.c
>> - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
>> + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
>> */
>>
>> #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> index 468a3ba..da92fcc 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>> * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
>> * little-endian format
>> */
>> - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
>> + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
>>
>> /* 2nd: template digest */
>> ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> /* 3rd: template name size */
>> namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
>> - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
>> + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
>>
>> /* 4th: template name */
>> ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
>> @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
>> /*
>> * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
>> */
>> -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
>> +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>> {
>> /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
>> if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> index 149ee11..50413d0 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
>> @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
>> * ima_rdwr_violation_check
>> *
>> * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
>> - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
>> + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
>> * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
>> * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
>> - * could result in a file measurement error.
>> + * could result in a file measurement error.
>> *
>> */
>> static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 947cdbe..41021b4 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
>> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
>> *
>> * ima_policy.c
>> - * - initialize default measure policy rules
>> + * - initialize default measure policy rules
>> *
>> */
>> #include <linux/module.h>
>> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
>> #include "ima.h"
>>
>> /* flags definitions */
>> -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
>> -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
>> +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
>> +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
>> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
>> #define IMA_UID 0x0008
>> #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
>> @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
>> * and running executables.
>> */
>> static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
>> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
>> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
>> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
>> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
>> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
>> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
>> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
>> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
>> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
>> };
>>
>> static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
>> + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
>> };
>>
>> static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
>> @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
>> }
>> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>>
>> -/*
>> +/*
>> * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
>> * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
>> * stale LSM policy.
>> *
>> - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
>> + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
>> * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
>> */
>> static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
>> @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ retry:
>> retried = 1;
>> ima_lsm_update_rules();
>> goto retry;
>> - }
>> + }
>> if (!rc)
>> return false;
>> }
>> @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
>> if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
>> return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
>>
>> - switch(func) {
>> + switch (func) {
>> case MMAP_CHECK:
>> return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
>> case BPRM_CHECK:
>> @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
>> measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
>> appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
>> ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
>> -
>> +
>> for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
>> if (i < measure_entries)
>> list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
>> @@ -522,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
>> - &entry->fsmagic);
>> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
>> if (!result)
>> entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
>> break;
>> @@ -549,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
>> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
>> if (!result) {
>> entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
>> if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
>> @@ -566,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
>> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
>> if (!result) {
>> entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
>> if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
>> index 91128b4..552705d 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
>> @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
>>
>> mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
>> if (!violation) {
>> - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
>> + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
>> if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
>> audit_cause = "hash_exists";
>> result = -EEXIST;
>> @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
>> }
>>
>> if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
>> - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
>> + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
>>
>> tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
>> if (tpmresult != 0) {
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
>> index 9a4a0d1..a076a96 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
>> @@ -22,20 +22,20 @@
>>
>> static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
>> {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
>> - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
>> - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
>> + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
>> + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
>> };
>>
>> static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
>> - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
>> + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
>> .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
>> - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
>> + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
>> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
>> - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
>> + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
>> .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
>> - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
>> + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
>> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
>> - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
>> + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
>> .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
>> };
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
>> index 793d7be..aab9fa5 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
>> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
>> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
>> *
>> * File: integrity_audit.c
>> - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
>> + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
>> */
>>
>> #include <linux/fs.h>
>> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
>> {
>> unsigned long audit;
>>
>> - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
>> + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
>> integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
>> return 1;
>> }
>
>
--
Thanks,
Dmitry
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