linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Thu, 13 Mar 2014 10:25:43 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com>
Cc:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	jkaluza@...hat.com, lpoetter@...hat.com, kay@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PEERCGROUP

On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 9:33 AM, Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 11:00 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 10:55:34AM -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
>>
>> [..]
>> > > > This might not be quite as awful as I thought.  At least you're
>> > > > looking up the cgroup at connection time instead of at send time.
>> > > >
>> > > > OTOH, this is still racy -- the socket could easily outlive the cgroup
>> > > > that created it.
>> > >
>> > > That's a good point. What guarantees that previous cgroup was not
>> > > reassigned to a different container.
>> > >
>> > > What if a process A opens the connection with sssd. Process A passes the
>> > > file descriptor to a different process B in a differnt container.
>> >
>> > Stop right here.
>> > If the process passes the fd it is not my problem anymore.
>> > The process can as well just 'proxy' all the information to another
>> > process.
>> >
>> > We just care to properly identify the 'original' container, we are not
>> > in the business of detecting malicious behavior. That's something other
>> > mechanism need to protect against (SELinux or other LSMs, normal
>> > permissions, capabilities, etc...).
>> >
>> > > Process A exits. Container gets removed from system and new one gets
>> > > launched which uses same cgroup as old one. Now process B sends a new
>> > > request and SSSD will serve it based on policy of newly launched
>> > > container.
>> > >
>> > > This sounds very similar to pid race where socket/connection will outlive
>> > > the pid.
>> >
>> > Nope, completely different.
>> >
>>
>> I think you missed my point. Passing file descriptor is not the problem.
>> Problem is reuse of same cgroup name for a different container while
>> socket lives on. And it is same race as reuse of a pid for a different
>> process.
>
> The cgroup name should not be reused of course, if userspace does that,
> it is userspace's issue. cgroup names are not a constrained namespace
> like pids which force the kernel to reuse them for processes of a
> different nature.
>

You're proposing a feature that will enshrine cgroups into the API use
by non-cgroup-controlling applications.  I don't think that anyone
thinks that cgroups are pretty, so this is an unfortunate thing to
have to do.

I've suggested three different ways that your goal could be achieved
without using cgroups at all.  You haven't really addressed any of
them.

In order for something like this to go into the kernel, I would expect
a real use case and a justification for why this is the right way to
do it.

"Docker containers can be identified by cgroup path" is completely
unconvincing to me.

--Andy
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/